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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the relationship between productivity growth and research activities
of heterogeneous firms, and the contribution of firm heterogeneity to business cycle fluctuations.
The first chapter uses a dynamic model to study firms’ decisions on whether to conduct research
in house, with external units or via both modes. Productivity is modeled to evolve endogenously
according to Research and Development (R&D) modes, and the costs of starting and continuing
research are random and mode specific. Model estimates from a panel of Chinese manufactur-
ing firms show that in-house R&D is more effective and costs less to maintain, but smaller firms
choose external R&D because of its lower startup cost. These estimates are consistent with the ob-
served cross-sectional differences in firm size by research status, and can match the persistence and
transition dynamics in R&D modes. Simulation exercises show that continuation cost reduction
induces more changes in R&D decisions, but start up cost reduction leads to most of the aggregate
productivity gain.
The second chapter investigates the impact of innovation on firm level prices. This impact
depends on how innovation affects quality and efficiency and how the firm passes these changes
onto prices. Estimation results of the empirical model with a panel of Spanish firms show that firms
take advantage of process innovations to enlarge markups by not completely passing onto prices
the decrease in cost. Product innovations could increase or decrease cost but they do not affect
markups, thus we do not find prices to change systematically with them.
The third chapter examines the contribution of firm level shocks to output fluctuations for
four OECD countries (US, Germany, Canada and the UK). Recent studies stemming from Gabaix
vi
(2011) show that when few firms account for a disproportionately large share of production, shocks
to these firms can propagate to generate business cycle fluctuations. However, we find that while
firm size distribution is highly skewed in these four economies, the ability of the largest firms to
transmit shocks is not universal and thus should not be taken for granted.
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Chapter 1
The Dynamics of R&D Organization and Productivity
Growth
1.1 Introduction
The organization of research and development (R&D) activities differs across firms and varies over
time. Some firms choose to perform R&D in house, some contract with other firms or research
institutions, and some use a combination of the two modes. While the existing studies have ex-
amined extensively the performance consequences of R&D organization, few consider what drives
the variations in organization decisions for research and why a firm’s chosen mode is not invari-
ant over time.1 Since R&D investments have uncertain returns but when successful they increase
productivity, a better understanding of how firms organize research is important for assessing the
implications of R&D for growth and welfare.
In this paper, I use a dynamic structural model to show that selections into R&D modes are
driven by variation in startup and continuation costs and are further reinforced by mode-specific
returns. Which type of cost is relevant depends on a firm’s previous period research status; the
respective costs are also random and the associated uncertainty dictates the transitions in and out
of R&D modes. I then estimate this model with a panel of Chinese manufacturing firms to quantify
the costs and benefits of the different research modes. With the model estimates, I analyze how
productivity and cost uncertainty affect firm dynamics in R&D organization, and in turn, what the
implications are for firm-level and aggregate productivity growth when cost uncertainty is reduced.
1There are a few notable exceptions. Aghion and Tirole (1994) use an incomplete contract framework to model the
static management of R&D. Aw et al. (2011) and Peters et al. (2013) also use a dynamic structural model to investigate
the costs of overall R&D activity, without considering how it is organized.
2The task of quantifying research costs calls for a dynamic structural model because they are
often unobserved, vary and paid across time periods. Firms not active in R&D face the cost of
setting up research labs and recruiting talent in the case of internal R&D or the transaction costs
associated with identifying the appropriate research unit to partner with in the case of external
R&D. After these irreversible startup costs are paid, firms incur a per-period cost to remain active
in research. These maintenance costs not only entail explicit expenditures such as payments to
R&D personnel and capital, but also unobserved heterogeneous components that manifest in the
efficiency of the contracting environment, the availability of credit, R&D services and talent.
To account for the complex nature of research costs, I follow the approach in Aw et al. (2011)
and Peters et al. (2013) to model them as random draws observed to the firm, but not to the econo-
metrician. However, instead of treating R&D as a single activity, I let research (startup and con-
tinuation) costs and benefits differ by modes in order to examine organization dynamics and the
associated implications for productivity growth.
The model mechanism is straightforward. Each period, firms consider the status-dependent
cost draws associated with the different R&D modes in hand, and choose the R&D mode that gives
the highest expected payoffs by solving a simultaneous choice problem. This expectation is formed
over future uncertainty in research cost and the returns on R&D organization; current internal and
external R&D decisions are endogenous and they have different growth effects because productivity
(a combination of unobserved technical efficiency and product quality) is an endogenous Markov
process of R&D organization. The parameters in the returns and the cost distributions are then
estimated from the data such that they can rationalize the observed R&D decisions and dynamics.
The data used for estimating the model are a three year panel of Chinese firms from the 2003
Enterprise Survey conducted jointly by the World Bank and the Chinese National Bureau of Statis-
tics. Some empirical regularities arise from this panel of Chinese firms. Firms that do not perform
R&D have the smallest sales, and among R&D performers firms that conduct research both in
house and with external units are the largest, followed by internal only, and lastly by external R&D
only performers. The transition matrix in R&D structure shows firms are persistent in R&D modes,
but more so in internal than in external. Finally, firms not active in research are more likely to start
3with external R&D and firms with in-house R&D switch in and out of external activities.
The model estimates are consistent with the aforementioned empirical observations and provide
insights into the trade-offs faced by firms. In house R&D is more effective, cheaper to maintain, but
costs more to start than external R&D. This delivers selection into R&D structure that reinforces the
cross-sectional differences in firms by research status observed in the data. The combination of the
large startup but smaller continuation cost estimated for in house R&D rationalizes the observation
where firms with internal knowledge capacity rarely quit research. The lower estimate for external
startup cost and higher external continuation cost relative to that of internal R&D are in line with
the more frequently observed entries and exits in external R&D activities. It is also consistent with
the hypothesis that it requires less commitment to outsource research. Since contractual R&D does
not commit firms to engineers and capital, internal R&D performers additionally switch in and out
of external R&D. The reason could be the firm requires additional skills for one-off projects or it
wants to take advantage of off-the-shelf technology from external sources.
The estimated model provides a laboratory for examining what happens to firm dynamics in
R&D organization and productivity growth if research costs were reduced. I find that reduction
in startup cost would induce entry but also quitting because of a reduction in the option value of
investing. Reduction in continuation costs would increase persistence in research and induce entry.
In either type of cost reduction, adjustments along external R&D dimension account for almost
70% of the productivity gain and they also affect a larger share of firms. This is in line with the
findings in Agrawal et al. (2014), where they find that under a tax incentive program for firms in
Canada, after-tax cost elasticity is higher for contractual R&D than R&D wage bills for in-house
personnel.
Although continuation cost reduction induces more changes in R&D organization via entry
and increases persistence, startup cost reduction leads to a higher aggregate productivity gain. For
this sample of Chinese firms, there are still a sizable proportion of firms inactive in research and
the startup cost is much more substantial than continuation cost. As a result, the quitting channel
does not operate pervasively to erode productivity gain. While continuation cost reduction induces
entry, it also encourages firms less productive in research to continue. These results from this
4simulation exercise suggest that growth implications of R&D cost reduction are context specific.
They are determined by the degree of cost uncertainty associated with different research modes and
the initial distribution of firms’ research status and productivity. Failing to take these factors into
account jointly could mislead R&D policies.
Lastly, to assess the importance of R&D organization, I compare the model with one where
R&D is a single activity. When R&D organization is not considered, the startup cost is twice
the external startup cost and only slightly lower than that of in-house R&D. This precludes some
medium size firms from investing in research and some large firms from contracting with external
units for temporary research needs. As a result, cost reductions lead to productivity growth that is
almost 13% less when firms cannot choose how to organize R&D.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 discusses this paper’s contribution
to the relevant literature. Section 3.2 describes the data and provides descriptive statistics that
motivate the dynamic model, which is then laid out in Section 1.4. The estimation strategy of the
model is outlined in Section 1.5. The estimation results are summarized in Section 1.6. Using the
estimates, I conduct R&D cost reduction simulation exercises in Section 1.7. Finally, Section 1.8
concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
This paper is most closely related to studies that examine the costs of R&D: one strand of which
finds evidence of R&D sunk and fixed cost while the other estimates them as this paper does.
By examining the lagged structure of R&D and export decisions, Aw et al. (2007) find that R&D
activities are much less persistent than export for Taiwanese firms and differences in sunk cost is
likely the explanation. Following a tax incentive scheme in Canada, Agrawal et al. (2014) find
firms’ differential responses in R&D wage bills versus contractual expenditures as evidence for the
existence of R&D fixed costs. Aw et al. (2011) and Peters et al. (2013) estimate the actual level
of R&D costs for Taiwanese and German firms. The former paper estimates a dynamic structural
model of the firm’s decision to export and conduct R&D, and the latter of the firm’s decision to
5conduct R&D taking into account innovation outcomes. Both Aw et al. (2011) and Peters et al.
(2013) find R&D costs to be significant, and that sunk cost is significantly more than fixed cost.
This paper takes after these two studies in modeling the trade-offs faced by a firm when making
R&D decisions, but allows research to be conducted in house and/or outsourced in order to study
organization dynamics.2
This paper contributes to the literature that empirically investigates the effectiveness of internal
versus external R&D and whether they are substitutes or complements. These studies often find
internal R&D to be more effective than external R&D.3 However, there is no consensus on whether
R&D modes are complements or substitutes, e.g. whether internal R&D increases a firm’s “ab-
sorptive capacity” to learn from external units.4 Lokshin et al. (2008) find complementarity to exist
only when firms have invested enough in internal R&D. Using a panel of Swedish firms, Bergman
(2011) also finds internal and contractual R&D are complements only for firms with high R&D
intensities. The conclusion in Audretsch et al. (1996) is similar in that they find complementarity
(substitutability) between the two modes for high (low) tech industries. Cassiman and Veugelers
(2006) find the degree of complementarity depends on how reliant firms are on universities and
research centers. Breaking up external R&D to contractual versus collaborative, Schmiedeberg
(2008) finds complementarity between in house and cooperative R&D but not contractual R&D.5
The complementarity of R&D modes remains context-specific, and even within a given context
the effect is heterogeneous. The way R&D costs are modeled in the paper could potentially recon-
cile these conflicting findings. While I do not find significant interaction of internal and external
R&D in the context of China (lack of complementarity), the realized random cost draws could put
a firm in either situation. And the reason for which could be due to either correlations in the cost
2Another closely related study is Amoroso (2014); she also estimates the sunk and fixed costs of research, but the
aim is to understand how these costs are different when firms also cooperate with external units. She finds sunk cost of
R&D to be higher than that of innovation, and these costs are lower when firms collaborate with external units.
3Bonte (2003) is an exception where he finds external R&D to have a higher productivity effect than internal R&D
using a panel of West German firms.
4Cohen and Levinthal (1989) is one of the first studies to use the term “absorptive capacity” to describe that tacit
knowledge is more easily acquired if the firm also engages actively in research pertaining to relevant fields.
5For examples of studies that define technology sourcing as external R&D, see Hou and Mohnen (2013) and Hou
(2013). Since the objective of this paper is to examine the firm’s deliberate effort to conduct research, I do not consider
additionally the role of licensing.
6shocks or economies of scope.
This paper is also related to the literature that examine the determinants of R&D structure, one
of which concerns the differences in innovation needs. Beneito (2006) finds in a panel of Span-
ish firms that internal R&D is most productive for significant innovation while contracted R&D
is oriented more towards innovation of incremental nature. On the other hand, industry leaders
conclude that focused innovations often take place internally and serendipitous ones externally.6 In
an incomplete contract framework, Aghion and Tirole (1994) predicts that research is more likely
to be conducted in house if effort or capital inputs from the firm are more important for innovation
success than those from the research unit. This paper takes an agnostic approach when mapping
innovation needs and R&D modes; the motive for research is to enhance profit position, and firms
use different R&D modes to achieve process and product innovation since productivity is modeled
as a combination of technical efficiency and product quality.7
Another determinant of R&D modes is a firm’s internal financing capability, and the theoretical
model in Aghion and Tirole (1994) predicts that firms with “deep pockets” (or larger firms) are
more likely to integrate research in house.8 This paper also documents the observed selection of
larger firms into doing research in house. However, it does not model the role of credit constraints;
firms are capable of paying the lump sum set up and continuation costs as long as the marginal
benefit exceeds the cost.
1.3 Empirical Evidence
This section first describes the data and then presents descriptive statistics that motivate the dy-
namic model. There exists a pecking order in firm heterogeneity with respect to research modes;
none-R&D performers are the smallest and least productive, followed by firms that only conduct
research with external units, then firms with in-house research teams, and lastly firms that do both
6Views of industry leaders are summarized from the 2008 Centennial Global Business Summit that took place in the
Harvard Business School.
7See Cohen (2010) for a more comprehensive overview for determinants of overall R&D expenditure level.
8There is also a related strand of studies that investigates the role of credit constraint on the overall level of R&D
investments, rather than on R&D modes. See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) for the theoretical backdrop, Himmelberg and
Petersen (1994) and Hottenrott and Peters (2012) for empirical evidence in the US and Germany.
7are the largest. Firms are highly persistent in their research modes, but entry and exits in external
R&D is much more frequently observed.
1.3.1 Data and Variable Description
The empirical analyses in this paper are based on the 2003 Enterprise Survey conducted jointly by
the World Bank and the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. The sample consists of manufac-
turing establishments representative of 9 sectors, located across 14 provinces and 1 municipality in
China.9 27% of all establishments reported to be a member of a group company, but “each made its
own financial decisions and had its own financial statements separate from those of the firm. It also
had its own management and control over its payroll.”10 The rest of this paper uses establishments
and firms interchangeably, and treats them as independent decision-makers.
Firms were surveyed in 2003 for extensive information on production, business and investment
climate over the fiscal year ending in 2002, and 2 years of retrospective data were recorded for a
subset of questions. In the end a three year panel for 1266 firms spanning the period 2000-2002
was constructed for the following variables: sales, capital, material inputs, and R&D activities. A
firm is defined as an internal R&D performer if it had its own research team in house with R&D
personnel, and an external R&D performer if it had contractual relationships with other firms,
universities or research institutions.11
Apart from production and R&D variables that are used to estimate the model, I also take
variables of innovation outcome, firms’ research and organization environment from the cross-
sectional part of the extensive questionnaire to examine how these variables correlate with R&D
modes. This part of the empirical exercise is meant to complement the model by shedding light on
9The 9 sectors are food processing, biotech products, garment & leather, household electronics, metallurgical pro-
duction, electronic equipment, transportation parts, chemical products and electronic parts. Their geographic locations
were chosen to reflect where the bulk of manufacturing activities took place. China has 22 provinces, 5 autonomous
regions, 4 municipalities and 2 special administrative regions.
10Requirement taken from the questionnaire manual. 34% of the establishments that were members of a group com-
pany reported to benefit from R&D programs of other member companies, which makes up about 9% of the total number
of firms in the sample.
11Whether the nature of contractual relationship was “cooperative” is not known. In a separate section of the survey,
firms additionally reported R&D expenditures on labor, capital and technology sourcing. However, there is no clear
mapping on how to split these categories further into expenditures on in house versus external activities.
8which R&D mode is associated with more innovation success and thus higher returns, and what
the unobserved research costs in the model could represent.
1.3.2 Firm Level Characteristics by R&D Modes
Table 1.1 reports average firm level characteristics by the four mutually exclusive R&D modes
(NoRD, ExtRD only, IntRD only and Both) to examine how firms differ across categories. Panel A
reports basic measures of firm heterogeneities, Panel B summarizes innovation performance, and
Panel C presents organization and research environment variables.
The observation counts in the last row show that 45.4% of the 1266 firms do not perform R&D,
8.6% conduct R&D with external units only, 26.6% in house only and the rest of the firms do
both (19.3%). The distribution of firm heterogeneity as measured by average sales, number of
employees, capital, capital intensity and productivity show firms that conduct R&D both in house
and with external units are the largest, followed by internal R&D only and then external R&D only
performers. The hierarchical order is robust to industry and location controls, the results for which
are summarized in Table 1.10 of Appendix 1.9.5.
The pecking order suggests selection into R&D modes by firm heterogeneity and/or a mirrored
pattern of returns to R&D modes. However, performance difference across R&D modes is not
trivial to assess, since R&D organization decisions are endogenous to firm specific capabilities,
economic and organization environment. Firms that find internal R&D to be most effective are
more likely to conduct research in house, and firms that find arm’s length R&D to suit their needs
will choose accordingly. A simple comparison of the resulting innovation outcomes may mislead
one about the effectiveness across R&D modes.
Panel B of Table 1.1 reports innovation outcomes that firms reported as dummy variables, with
the exception of number of patents obtained. This limits one from comparing qualitative differences
in research output across firms by R&D modes. Nonetheless, Panel B shows that the pecking order
by R&D mode is also observed (albeit much less stark) in number of patents obtained and whether a
firm introduced new product, new business line and new process. However, the difference between
external only and internal only R&D mode is not statistically different from each other. Though
9it is very clear that firms that do both types of R&D unambiguously produce the most research
output. Lastly, firms defined as none performers in this paper also have some research output.12
While the existing literature has extensively studied the determinants of overall R&D expendi-
ture and innovation success, few explore the impact of organization and research environments on
the chosen R&D modes. Panel C attempts to shed light on these variables by reporting summary
statistics on whether a firm had a manager with a post graduate degree, whether it had a line of
credit at the bank, the percentage of firms that are stateowned, whether the firm was located in a
special economic zone and the whether R&D services were available. While these variables are
statistically significant in explaining R&D organization, there is not a clear pattern on which of
them are associated with a specific R&D mode.
Table 1.1: Average Firm Level Characteristics by R&D Modes
NoRD ExtRD IntRD Both
A. Firm Size and Productivity
Sales (mil. RMB) 57.3 60.6 170.6 308.3
Number of employees 296 380 531 990
Capital (mil. RMB) 25.4 37.2 49.9 167.1
Capital labor ratio (mil. RMB/employee) 21.7 29.8 41.9 58.8
Levinsohn-Petrin productivity 2.06 2.17 2.34 2.40
B. Innovation Performance
Introduced new product (%) 28.1 60.2 61.9 86.2
Introduced new business line (%) 13.5 30.2 31.4 46.6
Introduced new process (%) 27.1 55.9 51.3 75
Number of patents obtained 0.063 0.401 0.462 1.121
C. Organization and Research Environment
GM had post-graduate degree 4.8 12.2 16.3 25.5
Had line of credit at bank 20.8 33.2 36.4 44.7
Stateowned 16 24.2 19.5 22.5
Located in special zone 19.7 28.8 35.2 45.4
Availability of R&D services 39.6 67.3 63.8 79.7
N (%) 575 (45.4) 109 (8.6) 337 (26.6) 245 (19.3)
All figures are averages computed from 2000-2002. 1USD≈8RMB in 2002.
12Peters et al. (2013) also find that R&D expenditure is not necessary for introducing new products or processes.
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1.3.3 Transitions in R&D Modes
In addition to differences in firm performance by R&D modes, it is also observed in the data that
firms did not always conduct research via a fix mode. Table 1.2 shows the transition matrix in
R&D structure and provides some insights on how differences in costs across R&D mode could
rationalize the observed pattern.
The diagonal of the matrix reports the percentage of firms remaining in the same status from
t−1 to t, and it suggests R&D organization structure is highly persistent (the probability of staying
put ranges between 0.882 and 0.928). The first row shows that in this particular sample, non R&D
performers are more likely to start with external than in-house R&D in the next period (0.046
versus 0.021), and firms rarely transition to doing both types of R&D. The last two rows show that
once an internal research team is put in place, the firm almost never quits research and additionally
switches in and out of external R&D (11.4% of the internal R&D only performers take on external
R&D additionally the next period, while 8.2% of the firms that perform both drop off their external
R&D activities).
The persistence in R&D structure is indicative of hysteresis behavior that can be induced by
sunk set up costs and relatively lower continuation cost required to maintain research. The higher
frequencies of transitioning in and out of external compared with internal R&D suggest the former
may be associated with a lower start up but higher continuation cost. This observation is consistent
with the three potential roles external R&D plays. Firms with no prior R&D experience may start
with external R&D first before committing to research via in-house R&D, or to take advantage of
off-the-shelf technology for short-term performance. Internal R&D performers may additionally
take on external R&D for one-off projects in order to avoid building up excess capacity, or to
complement in-house capacity in the case of cooperative research.13
13It is beyond the scope of this paper to tease out the exact reasons behind internal R&D performers branching out to
external R&D.
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Table 1.2: Transition Matrix in R&D Modes
noRDt extRDt intRDt botht
noRDt−1 0.928 0.046 0.021 0.005
extRDt−1 0.071 0.888 0.005 0.036
intRDt−1 0.004 0 0.882 0.114
botht−1 0.002 0 0.082 0.915
All figures are averages computed from 2000-2002.
1.4 Model
The model developed in this section provides a framework for how heterogeneous firms in produc-
tivity and size make R&D investment decisions. A firm’s problem each period is divided into two
components: its static pricing and production decisions determine short-run profit, and its dynamic
choices of R&D modes enter to affect future productivity and profitability. Rather than deciding
on doing R&D or not, this model differs from its predecessors in that firms additionally consider
whether to conduct research in house, with external units or via a combination thereof. Facing cost
uncertainties associated with the different R&D modes, firms then choose the research organization
that gives the highest expected future payoffs.
1.4.1 Firms’ Static Production Decisions
Firms compete in a monopolistic competitive market. There are not strategic interactions among
producers, and they each take demand for its variety j at time t, Q jt, as given:
Q jt = ΦtP
−η
jt exp(ζ jt), Φt ≡ QtPη−1t . (1.1)
This demand is a function of the market demand index (Φt) consisting of the CES aggregate of
differentiated varieties and the price index (Pt), firm-level demand shifters (ζ jt), the elasticity of
substitution across varieties that is assumed to be constant and greater than 1 (η), and the price set
by the firm (P jt).
The profit-maximizing price that satisfies demand follows from the firm’s FOC, and it is a
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constant markup over its short-run marginal cost:
P jt =
η
η − 1MC jt. (1.2)
Firm j with Hicks-neutral technology (ψ jt) produces with capital (K jt) and variable inputs of la-
bor and materials, and the production function is assumed to be constant-returns-to-scale in these
variable factors. In turn, short-run marginal cost (MC jt) depends on (ψ jt, K jt) and common input
prices (Xt), whose exact expression depends on the functional form assumption on the production
function:14
MC jt = MC(K jt, Xt) exp(−ψ jt). (1.3)
Combining the equilibrium price and quantity yields the following per-period revenue and
profit (in logs):15
r jt = ln Φt − (η − 1) ln η
η − 1 − (η − 1)mc(k jt, Xt) + (η − 1)
(
ψ jt +
1
η − 1ζ jt
)
︸              ︷︷              ︸
ω jt
, (1.4)
pi jt = − ln η + r jt, (1.5)
where ω jt is the firm-specific productivity that is a combination of technology (ψ jt) and demand
shifter (ζ jt) that can reflect product quality as in Peters et al. (2013). The technology component
captures heterogeneities in revenue across firms relative to inputs, or a firm’s ability to produce at
a different unit cost from others. The quality component represents demand (dis)advantages that
could be explained by product differentiation. Both components of ω jt are known to the firm but
unobserved to the econometrician.
In the productivity literature, ω jt is often modeled as an exogenous Markov process, with
lagged productivity ω jt−1 to capture the persistence in a firm’s performance. In the innovation
14See Appendix 1.9.1 for its derivations.
15Equation 1.5 is derived by subtracting total variable cost (TVC = MC jtQ jt) from revenue, and simplified using (1.2)
to arrive at: Π jt = (1 − η−1η )Q jtP jt ≡ 1ηR jt.
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literature, there is a long tradition of modeling R&D investments as an additional input to the
production function (starting with Griliches, 1979). The object of empirical interest is then the
marginal returns of “knowledge capital stock” constructed from R&D expenditures. Doraszelski
and Jaumandreu (2013) endogenize the productivity process to depend on R&D efforts in a flexible
manner, later adapted in Aw et al. (2011), Peters et al. (2013), Bøler et al. (2015) and now also in
this paper.
Specifically, productivity evolves according to R&D organization decisions in a first-order
Markov process:
ω jt = g(ω jt−1, i jt−1, e jt−1) + ξ jt
= α0 + α1ω jt−1 + αee jt−1 + αii jt−1 + αiei jt−1 ∗ e jt−1 + ξ jt. (1.6)
ω jt shifts according to firm’s R&D organization decisions in the previous period for whether it con-
ducted research in house (i jt−1) and/or externally (e jt−1). ξ jt is the idiosyncratic shock that captures
uncertainty that is inherent in R&D investments, in addition to any surprises unknown to he firm at
the time of production. Thus the transition mapping of productivity growth is probabilistic rather
than deterministic. Finally, R&D decisions have permanent effects on performance via ω jt−1. How
much of the benefits persist over time depends on the coefficient on lagged productivity, relative
contribution of the different R&D modes and the amount of uncertainty represented by ξ jt.
As also apparent in (1.6), both efficiency and profitability can be shaped by R&D activities.
This paper takes an agnostic view on whether firms use internal or external R&D for improving
marginal cost or product attractiveness, for incremental or drastic innovations. The reasons are
twofolds. Firstly, information on innovation outcome is only available as categorical variable over
the three years in the panel. Secondly, even with continuous variables recorded at the right fre-
quency, it is an econometric challenge to causally identify whether internal or external R&D is
more productive for which kind of innovation for reasons outlined in Section 1.3.2.
In the end, the key static parameters of interest for estimation are those governing the returns
from research modes in the productivity process. These parameters are common knowledge and
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the same across firms. However, the resulting impact of research each period is size (K jt) and shock
(ξ jt) dependent; since productivity is Hicks neutral, a given percentage increase in ω jt translates
into a higher level of profit for larger firms. While R&D decisions are endogenous, I do not model
the choice on capital in this paper and take them as given.
1.4.2 Firms’ Dynamic Problem
With the law of motion governing productivity in eq (1.6), firms can form expectations of their
future profits for a given R&D mode, and the actual research choice depends also on R&D costs
that must be incurred to realize the expected productivity gain. Firms wishing to start R&D or
restart after inactivity pay a lump-sum set up cost to form a research lab with equipment and
recruited technical personnel, or the transaction cost to locate and then form a partnership with
an external unit. Once a research lab is established or a research partner is identified, the costs to
maintain research in the form of capital and wage expenditures continue to be different each period.
These costs can also have unobserved components that represent variations in the efficiency of the
contract and organization environment, availability of credit or external R&D services.
The heterogeneities in the aforementioned R&D costs are difficult to measure and often unob-
served, and may also vary over time. I follow Aw et al. (2011) and Peters et al. (2013) to account
for them in the model as independent draws from a joint CDF CF , where F = (Fi, Fe, f i, f e) is
the set of the four random cost variables and (Fijt, F
e
jt, f
i
jt, f
e
jt) are the realized internal and external
R&D startup (upper case F) and fixed costs (lower case f).16
Each period, firms compare the expected present discounted value of profits from the possible
R&D choices with the realization of the cost draws to choose a research mode that gives the highest
pay off. The corresponding Bellman equation with the vector of observed state variables s jt =(
k jt, ω jt, i jt−1, e jt−1
)
and the vector of unobserved state variables F jt is as follows:
16Internal and external cost draws are independent of firm characteristics and of each other. One can alternatively
model the costs as fix parameters and each R&D mode is associated with a stochastic shock and model these shocks to
be correlated. This specification and preliminary results are outlined in Appendix 1.9.4.
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V(s jt,F jt) = Π(s jt) + max
i jt ,e jt
{ − i jtCijt − e jtCejt (1.7)
+ δ
∑
ω jt+1
∫
F jt+1
V(s jt+1,F jt+1)dCF (F )dP(ω jt+1|ω jt, i jt, e jt)},
where δ is the discount factor, dCF is the aforementioned distribution of costs, and dP(ω jt+1|ω jt, i jt, e jt)
is the Markov transition probability distribution that summarizes firms’ beliefs about future states
governed by eq (1.6).17 Lastly, Cijt, C
e
jt represent the costs associated with internal and external
R&D choices that depend on lagged decisions (i jt−1, e jt−1).
Firm j pays a continuation cost if it was active in research the previous period, and a set-up
cost if it was not for each of the two R&D choices:
Cijt = (1 − i jt−1)Fijt + i jt−1 f ijt,
Cejt = (1 − e jt−1)Fejt + e jt−1 f ejt.
The cost expressions indicate that stopping and starting R&D is costly because a firm will have to
pay the start up cost again that is irreversible. The requirement of a startup cost induces hysteresis
behavior; in face of a bad continuation draw (higher cost for the same percentage improvement
in productivity), a firm may not quit research right away because future costs may be lower and
by maintaining research through bad times it avoids paying the startup cost again. In addition
to choosing whether to start or stop research, firms also need to consider the trade-offs among
the R&D modes by comparing how the startup and fixed costs differ across them, in conjunction
with how they contribute differentially to productivity gain via the transition matrix of productivity
dP(ω jt+1|·).
With the choices of internal and external mode, a firm in the end faces a menu of four research
statuses to choose from: none (n), external R&D only (e), internal R&D only (i), and both internal
and external (ie). The actual realized cost draws that rationalize the firms’ decisions are observed
17It is implied from the expression for dP(·) that the transition probability of is independent of the state variable k jt.
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by the firm but not the econometrician, thus the dynamic parameters of interest for estimations are
those that characterize the distribution of costs.
Integrating the Bellman equation over these unobserved shocks, and re-writing it with the short-
hands for choice-specific continuation values gives the following expression:
V¯(s jt) =
∫

Π(s jt) + max
i jt ,e jt

δEV¯n,
−Cejt + δEV¯e,
−Cijt + δEV¯ i,
−Cijt −Cejt + δEV¯ ie


dCF (F ), (1.8)
where V¯(s jt) =
∫
V(s jt,F jt)dCF (F ) is the integrated value function, and EVn, EVe, EV i, EV ie
are the choice-specific value functions corresponding to the four possible R&D statuses:
EV¯n ≡
∑
ω jt+1
V¯(s jt+1)dP(ω jt+1|ω jt, i jt = 0, e jt = 0), (1.9)
EV¯e ≡
∑
ω jt+1
V¯(s jt+1)dP(ω jt+1|ω jt, i jt = 0, e jt = 1), (1.10)
EV¯ i ≡
∑
ω jt+1
V¯(s jt+1)dP(ω jt+1|ω jt, i jt = 1, e jt = 0), (1.11)
EV¯ ie ≡
∑
ω jt+1
V¯(s jt+1)dP(ω jt+1|ω jt, i jt = 1, e jt = 1), (1.12)
A firm’s organization decision for each of the four choices from the maximization problem must
then satisfy the following inequality:
n jtδEV¯n + e jt(δEV¯e −Ce) + i jt(δEV¯ i −Ci) + ie jt(δEV¯ ie −Ci −Ce) (1.13)
>{(1 − n jt)δEV¯n &
(1 − e jt)(δEV¯e −Ce) &
(1 − i jt)(δEV¯ i −Ci) &
(1 − ie jt)(δEV¯ ie −Ci −Ce)}.
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For a given state (ω jt,K jt, i jt−1, e jt−1), the set of cost draws that are consistent with the inequal-
ity (1.13) are depicted in Figure 1.1. In each of the three panels, the plane is divided into four
disjoint regions by solid lines. Each region represents one out of the four R&D modes (n, e, i, ie)
and is sectioned off by the set of inequalities that specifies the corresponding action that gives the
highest return. The specific expressions for the cutoffs are:18
a = δ(EV¯ i − EV¯n), a′ = δ(EV¯e − EV¯n),
b = δ(EV¯ ie − EV¯e), b′ = δ(EV¯ ie − EV¯ i),
c = δ(EV¯ i − EV¯e), m = δ(EV¯ ie − EV¯n),
ab = δ(EV¯ i − EV¯n), a′b′ = δ(EV¯e − EV¯n).
1. i and e as Substitutes
2. i and e as Complements
3. Neither
Figure 1.1: R&D Modes Defining Regions
There are three panels in Figure 1.1 because the ordering of the marginal benefits between
different research modes (a, b and a′, b′) depends on whether the two R&D choices are substitutes,
complements or neither. Panel 1 depicts the case when the two activities are substitutes; farming
out research in addition to in-house research has the similar implication of diminishing returns to
increasing research intensity. This scenario can be represented by the following restriction:
δ(EV¯ ie − EV¯n) < δ(EV¯ i − EV¯n) + δ(EV¯e − EV¯n). (1.14)
18The derivations are outlined in the Appendix.
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Panel 2 depicts the case of complementarity with the opposite inequality sign in (1.14), or that
the marginal benefit of doing one type of R&D is greater when the firm also does the other. This
has the interpretation that in-house R&D may increase a firm’s absorptive capacity to obtain tacit
knowlege from external units, a concept first discussed in Cohen and Levinthal (1989). Last but
not least, Panel 3 depicts the case when neither substitution nor complementarity is at play, and so
the marginal benefit of doing both types of R&D is simply the sum of each activity.
In which scenario a firm ends up depends on the static returns parameters in the productivity
process (1.6), the relative costs associated with each R&D mode, and the productivity and size of
firm. The estimation of the model allows one to assess the importance of research costs, and how
well this model uses them to explain firms’ research decisions.
1.5 Estimation Strategy
The estimation procedure consists of two stages. The first stage is the estimation of the parameters
in a firm’s profit function: Φt, η, marginal cost function parameters in mc(k jt, Xt), as well as the
returns to R&D modes in the Markov process g(ω jt−1, e jt−1, i jt−1, ie jt−1). These static parameters
form the basis of a firm’s expectation of its productivity evolution and discounted profit streams,
which are then embedded in the dynamic estimation of the firm’s problem to obtain the R&D cost
distribution parameters using Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC).
1.5.1 Identification Strategy and Estimation Procedure of the Static Parameters
To estimate the parameters in the revenue and profit function, it remains to specify the marginal
cost function.19 For a given production function, the corresponding short-run marginal cost (1.3)
can be estimated as a function of factor prices (xt) and capital:
mc jt = β0 + βxxt − βkk jt − ψ jt. (1.15)
19In this section, all lower case letters denote the variables in logs.
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Substituting this expression into revenue and rearranging the terms give the following equation for
revenue:
r jt = const. + βtt + (η − 1)(βkk jt + ω jt) + ν jt, (1.16)
where the constant term absorbs (η, β0), and βtt captures the economy-wide market index and
factor prices.20
However, the revenue equation (1.16) is not directly estimable because productivity is unob-
served. In earlier papers of the productivity estimation literature, such as Olley and Pakes (1996),
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003a) and Ackerberg et al. (2006), productivity is assumed to be an ex-
ogenous AR(1) process, whereas Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013) endogenize the process and
allow it to evolve according to a firm’s R&D expenditures. Aw et al. (2011) adapt the endogenous
specification and estimate productivity from the revenue equation in the first stage. With the esti-
mated productivity series, they obtain the coefficients for the Markov process in the second stage.21
This paper follows the same estimation strategy and is outlined as follows.
I assume a firm’s choices on material depend on their state variables k jt and ω jt:
m jt = m(k jt, ω jt). (1.17)
As long as the demand function for material is monotonically increasing in productivity and capital,
one can invert (1.17) and use a function of capital and materials observed in the data to proxy for
productivity: ω jt = m−1(k jt,m jt). I assume this inverted function m−1(·) to be a polynomial of
degree two in its arguments.22 Substituting out ω with the polynomial gives an estimable revenue
equation with observables:
rit = const. + βtt + (η − 1)(βkk jt + m−1(k jt, ω jt)) + νit. (1.18)
20The exact expressions are: const. = −(η − 1)β0 − (η − 1) ln ηη−1 and βtt = ln Φt + βxxt.
21Ackerberg et al. (2006) also use a two-step estimation procedure but with an exogenous AR(1) process.
22It’s been argued that this approach of estimating productivity is subject to misspecification. In Appendix 1.9.5.2, I
lay out an alternative estimation strategy and its corresponding results.
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However, one will not be able to separately identify η, βk and the coefficient for capital in the
polynomial. Instead, an estimate for the function h(·) can be obtained:
r jt = const. + βtt + β1k jt + β2k2jt + β3m jt + β4m
2
jt + β5k jtm jt︸                                               ︷︷                                               ︸
h(k jt ,m jt)
+ν jt. (1.19)
We know from (1.18) that ĥ jt ≡ (̂η−1)(βkk jt+ω jt), or ω jt = ĥ jtη̂−1 −βkk jt. Substituting the expression
into the productivity process (1.6) gives:
ĥ jt = (η − 1)αo + (̂η − 1)βkk jt + (̂η − 1)α1(ĥ jt−1 − (̂η − 1)βkk jt−1) (1.20)
+ (̂η − 1)αee jt−1 + (̂η − 1)αii jt−1 + (̂η − 1)αieie jt−1 + (̂η − 1)ξ jt,
which can be estimated using NLS with η̂ that is estimated from the profit function:
pi jt = ln η + r jt + e jt. (1.21)
The identification of the parameters in the productivity process relies on two main assumptions.
The first is that shocks at time t ξ jt are orthogonal to the decisions made in the previous period.
The second assumption is that the estimate for h(·) is unbiased. More specifically, if there exists
unobservables that are correlated jointly with revenue and R&D organization structure in the first
stage (1.19), then the parameters in (1.19) are biased because unobserved productivity is a function
of R&D modes. If the estimate for h(·) is biased then subsequently so are the estimates in (1.20).
The rich questionnaire of this dataset allows me to incorporate firm-specific variables that may
be correlated with R&D decisions and at the same time affect revenue. Incorporating the corre-
sponding dimensions of firm heterogeneities increases the precision of the estimates, but at the
expense of a substantially longer estimation time of the dynamic component of the model due to an
increase in the number of state variables. In Appendix 1.9.5.3 Table 1.12, I show estimation results
for including these controls chosen by economic reasoning based on the innovation literature. The
qualitative features of the model are still preserved, and in the rest of this paper I focus on results
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from the baseline case that contains no additional controls.
1.5.2 Estimation Procedure of the Dynamic Parameters
Knowing the parameters for the revenue function and the productivity process, a firm can compute
its profit accordingly, form expectations of its productivity evolution, and arrive at the continuation
values of different R&D modes to compare them with the actual cost draw. These cost draws
are observable only to the firms, and the dynamic parameters of interest are the parameters of the
cost distributions. How variations in the data identify these parameters can be explained as follows.
R&D set up costs are identified from the probability of entry across firms with similar profit streams
but differ in their previous period status, whereas continuation costs are identified from the relative
frequencies (probability) of exit in R&D modes.23 In what follows, I outline the estimation strategy
in detail.
I assume the independent cost variables (Fi, f i, Fe, f e) follow the following exponential dis-
tribution (x > 0, y > 0):
Fi ∼ G(x) = 1 − exp
(
−x/γF
)
, f i ∼ G(x) = 1 − exp
(
−x/γ f
)
,
Fe ∼ L(y) = 1 − exp
(
−y/λF
)
, f e ∼ L(y) = 1 − exp
(
−y/λ f
)
where Θ = (γF , γ f , λF , λ f ) is the set of distribution means for internal and external sunk and fixed
costs. To estimate Θ with the dynamic model, I construct the likelihood function for the observed
patterns of firms’ R&D decisions:
L(Θ) = JΠ
j
T
Π
t
P(i jt, e jt|s jt,Θ). (1.22)
P(i, e|s,Θ) = PieiePi(1−e)i P(1−i)ee P(1−i)(1−e)n is the probability of the firm’s observed R&D decision
conditioning on its productivity, capital level, and R&D modes in the previous period.
T
Π
t
P(i, e|s,Θ)
is then each firm’s contribution to the likelihood. For a particular vector of Θ, these conditional
23One may argue from the transition matrix shown in Table 1.2 that there is almost no exit in internal R&D in the
data, but the upper bounds for internal sunk and fixed costs are still identified despite this observation.
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choice probabilities are evaluated over the regions specified in Figure 1.1 with cutoffs that are
determined by the value functions.24 But since the value functions are themselves functions of the
cost parameters, an iterative estimation procedure is invoked. One would start with guessed values
for the vector Θ, compute the value functions from iterating the Bellman equation (1.8), maximize
L with respect to Θ and iterate this process until convergence (Rust, 1987). In this paper, I use
instead Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) as Aw et al. (2011) do in their paper.
The intuitions behind Bayesian MCMC is as follows. Rather than assuming Θ as fixed to
obtain their point estimates for which the observed data are most probable to occur, Bayesian
inference treats these parameters as random variables and characterize the estimates and associated
uncertainties with their posterior distributions instead. The posterior is computed by multiplying
the likelihood and the prior distribution of the parameters. However, since the distribution of the
likelihood function is unknown, one can use MCMC to sample parameter values from the posterior
and then use these values to approximate the posterior means. In the end, Bayesian MCMC in
this context is especially valuable as it allows one to get around the problem of maximizing a non-
smooth or non-linear likelihood with respect to the parameters, as will be the case in this paper
due to the joint-decision problem. The detailed steps for the value function computation and the
construction of the likelihood function are spelled out in Appendix 1.9.2, whereas a more detailed
discussion of the Bayesian MCMC methodology can be found in Appendix 1.9.3.
1.6 Estimation Results
1.6.1 Static Parameters
In addition to the full model, I also estimate a version of it that does not distinguish R&D modes
for comparison. Recall the static parameters of interest are those in the revenue function and the
Markov productivity process (eq. 1.19 & 1.20). Stage 1 results and the estimate for the elasticity
of substitution from the relationship between revenue and profit are presented in Table 1.3. These
results are the same for both models. The variables in the polynomial of capital and materials are
24The expressions for each of the probabilities are outlined in Appendix 1.9.2.
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significant in explaining log revenue. The year dummies capture variations in aggregate demand
and common input prices. Their coefficients are insignificant, meaning that the index levels are
not that different from those in the base year 2000. The coefficient on profit is the elasticity of
substitution among varieties; it is significant and implies a markup of 26%.
With the first stage results, one can construct an expression that contains productivity, substi-
tuting into the endogenous Markov productivity process to estimate the parameters using nonlinear
least square. The results for the full model and the model with a single R&D choice are presented
in Column (1) and (2) of Table 1.4. In the full model, in-house and external R&D are expected to
increase ω by 2.6% and 2.1% respectively. The benefits of doing both types of R&D is significant
and the highest of all at 3.9%. The interaction of these two modes is negative but not statistically
different from zero. In the model where research organization is not taken into consideration, the
return to conducting research either via in house staff or with external units is 3%.
1.6.2 Dynamic Parameters
The dynamic estimates that correspond to these two models are summarized in Table 1.5. Column 1
presents the means of the exponential distributions, whereas Column 2 presents the average realized
cost draws paid by firms from 100 simulations. The average research cost as a share of revenue
and profit ratios are recorded in Columns (3) and (4), also computed from 100 simulations. These
averages are weighted by a firm’s size measured as revenue and profit relative to the economy
output.
The top panel of Table 1.5 presents the results for the full model are shown. The unconditional
(conditional) costs show that internal R&D costs almost 2.5 (1.5) times more than external to start,
but external R&D costs almost 2.5 (1.5) times more to maintain. These estimates elucidate the
trade-offs between the two research options, and are consistent with the observed transition in R&D
modes. Despite the higher returns of in-house research, smaller firms select into external R&D due
to its lower start up cost. Once a firm overcomes the set-up cost to establish an in-house research
team, it almost never quits. However, these internal R&D performers may additionally switch in
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Table 1.3: Static Estimates I
Estimation results for stage 1 and elasticity of substitution.
Regression of log revenue on year dummies and a polynomial
in log materials and log capital in Column (1) and on profit
in Column (2).
(1) (2)
log profit 4.871***
(0.143)
log materials 0.479***
(0.097)
log materials sq. 0.034***
(0.005)
log capital 0.223***
(0.075)
log capital sq. 0.025***
(0.005)
log materials * log capital -0.052***
(0.009)
year 2001 -0.012
(0.038)
year 2002 0.008
(0.035)
constant 3.610***
(0.516)
N 3798 3797
R2 0.841 0.234
Robust standard error corrected for heteroskedasticity
in parentheses, p < .1∗, p < .05∗∗, p < .01∗∗∗.
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Table 1.4: Static Estimates II
Estimation results for the Markov process of productivity.
Column (2) consists of results for the model with
single R&D category.
(1) (2)
log capital 0.070*** 0.070***
(0.015) (0.015)
α0 0.120*** 0.117**
(0.018) (0.017)
α1 0.945*** 0.946***
(0.011) (0.011)
αe 0.021**
(0.10)
αi 0.026***
(0.007)
αie -0.008
(0.516)
αrd 0.030***
(0.006)
N 2531 2405
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses,
p < .1∗, p < .05∗∗, p < .01∗∗∗. αi not
statistically different from αe.
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Table 1.5: Dynamic Parameter Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
parameters distribution mean realized mean
∑ R∑
R
C
R
∑ Π∑
Π
C
Π
(mil.RMB) (mil. RMB)
Full Model with R&D Organization
Internal γF 688 44.67 0.36 1.56
(47.78) (8.46)
γ f 3.14 3.13 0.018 0.078
(0.13) (0.13)
External λF 274 33.38 0.13 0.58
(11.68) (4.16)
λ f 8.89 7.54 0.030 0.133
(0.31) (0.45)
Model without R&D Organization
Startup Cost 516.58 62 0.56 2.478
(125.35) (10.82)
Continuation Cost 4.5 4.4 0.027 0.119
(0.301) (0.18)
In 2002, 1USD≈8RMB. SE in brackets.
and out of external R&D, to avoid having to build up in-house capacity for one-off projects.25
For either mode, startup cost is many times more than continuation cost (roughly 15 times over
in the case of conditional internal cost and 7 times in the case of external), which rationalizes the
persistence in R&D activities observed in the data. Forward looking firms will want to stick it
out in face of bad continuation draws in order to avoid having to pay for the start up cost again.
Lastly, this startup/fix ratio is also much higher for internal R&D. Coupled with the finding that
external R&D costs more to maintain, the higher startup/fix ratio for internal R&D implies that
in-house R&D is a continuing process of investment in knowledge capacity while external R&D is
relatively short-lived.26
25One can think of these one-off projects as projects that require external expertise or projects that require additional
staff that the firm is not able to accomodate.
26These ratios are much higher than those found in the referenced papers, and it could be attributed to the fact that I
define R&D very differently here. Firms must have active R&D personnel in-house and have declared to have contractual
relationship with external partners. In both Aw et al. (2011) and Peters et al. (2013), where R&D is not split into
categories, a firm is active in research as long as it has positive R&D expenditures. In Amoroso (2014), a firm is active
if it has R&D and if it has product or process innovations introduced.
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The summary of these costs as ratios of a firm’s revenue and profit in Columns (3) & (4) present
a similar pattern. The commitment to establish an internal R&D program is substantial, amounting
to almost 1.5 times per-period profit flow. This gives way to the possibility that credit-constraint is
one of the reasons that firms do not choose internal R&D in reality. Lastly, the continuation costs
as a share of revenue come out to be very close to R&D intensity measured in the data.
The bottom panel of Table 1.5 presents the results for the model without considerations for
R&D organization. The findings are qualitatively similar to those in the existing literature. Startup
cost is substantially higher than continuation cost. The actual magnitude varies from study to study,
however. How R&D actvities are defined, what their returns are, and the transitions in and out of
research all play important roles in determining their levels. The conditional costs from the average
of the 100 simulations are comparable to those in the full model; the startup cost is lower than the
sum of internal and external startup cost, and the continuation cost is slightly lower than the average
of the internal and external continuation costs.
To examine in-sample performance of the estimated parameters for the full model, I compare
how well the model predicts firms’ actions and how well the predicted series of productivity evo-
lution match those in the data. More specifically, I use the dynamic parameters estimates and
simulate 100 data sets of 3 periods taking the initial period R&D status as given, then compute
the transition matrix to report the averages over the 100 simulations in Table 1.6. The overall fit is
reasonable compared with those in Table 1.2. However, the model over-predicts the propensity to
undertake either mode of research for none-R&D performers. External R&D performers also quit
or additionally take on internal R&D much more often than what is observed in the data, and firms
that use both R&D modes quit external more frequently than in reality.27
In addition to examining the transition matrix, I compare the percentage of correct predictions
for each R&D modes. Averaging across the 100 simulations, the model predicts internal and ex-
ternal R&D modes correctly 91.4% and 79.4% of the time. These percentages are lower when I
break up the modes further; they are 78%, 55.5%, 75.5% & 65.3% for none, external only, internal
only and both. Lastly, I compare the kernel density of data versus simulated productivity level
27These discrepancies hint at the possibility that the external fixed cost may still too high and the sunk cost too low.
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from period 3 in Figure 1.2. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not reject the null that these two
samples are from the same distribution, serving as additional evidence that the model fit is good.
Table 1.6: Transition Matrix from Simulated Data using Model Estimates
noRDt extRDt intRDt botht
Model with R&D Organization
noRDt−1 0.871 0.068 0.055 0.006
extRDt−1 0.174 0.740 0.009 0.077
intRDt−1 0.015 0 0.875 0.110
botht−1 0 0 0.119 0.871
N (%) 40% 9.7% 29.6% 20.7%
Model without R&D Organization
noRDt−1 0.903 0.097
extRDt−1 0.030 0.970
N (%) 42% 58%
Figure 1.2: Kernel Density of Data versus Simualted Productivity Level
29
1.7 Simulation Results
In this section, I perform counter-factual exercises to examine how R&D cost reductions impact
organization dynamics, as well as how the resulting dynamics translate into productivity growth.
Specifically, I take the sample of firms’ initial year productivity and R&D organization as given,
then simulate cost shocks and solve for the firms’ decisions forward under a 50% reduction in the
cost parameters.
The key findings from the simulation exercises can be summarized as follows. Both startup
and continuation cost reductions stimulate R&D activities, but startup cost reduction leads to the
most productivity growth. Specifically, adjustments along the external margin account for most
of the changes in research status and almost 70% of the productivity gain. Relative to the model
without R&D organization, allowing firms to organize their research leads to a 13% more increase
in aggregate productivity when there is cost reduction. The reason is under a model with single
R&D choice, fewer firms are able to start research via a cheaper mode and larger firms are not able
to additionally contract with external units. In the rest of this section, I explain these findings with
simulation results in more details.28
Table 1.7 reports the changes in the transition matrix, after a 50% reductions in startup and
continuation R&D costs. More specifically, the changes are presented as the proportion of firms
that start and continue R&D relative to the proportions before reduction (Table 1.6). They are
averages over 100 simulations and each simulation consists of three time periods, the same as that
of the panel. I also report the one period growth in the aggregate productivity weighted by revenue
share after cost reduction in the last row:
∆ω˜t ≡ ω˜t − ω˜t−1 =
∑ R jt∑
R jt
ω jt −
∑ R jt−1∑
R jt−1
ω jt−1.
Focusing on the results for reduction in startup cost first, Row 1 of Columns (1)-(4) shows that
5.6% of the none-R&D performers take advantage of the startup cost reduction to start research,
28Like Peters et al. (2013), I also do not make any welfare analysis on whether the costs of the subsidy program
outweighs the benefits. There is no spillover effects of innovation in the model, thus firms internalize all R&D benefits.
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with internal only and external only research modes absorbing comparable fraction of entrants. The
fact that not more firms are selecting into internal R&D to take advantage of the lower continuation
cost implies that internal startup cost is still too high.
For R&D firms (Rows 2-4), there are asymmetric responses in how they switch modes in re-
sponse to startup cost reduction. Some external only R&D performers quit research (the category
nt sees an increase of 1.4%); others take advantage of cost reductions to start in house R&D (3.6%),
but some do so at the expense of dropping external activity (1%). Internal R&D firms rarely quit
in-house research but they adjust by either additionally taking on external R&D or dropping it. The
quitting effect is attributed to the narrowing of the “inaction band,” it refers to the set of random
costs that renders none performers unwilling to enter and performers unwilling to quit.
Nonetheless, the quitting channel under startup cost reduction did not operate pervasively
enough to counteract the gain from the entrants for this sample of firms in the aggregate, espe-
cially in the case of internal R&D. In the end, the one period productivity growth from reducing
both internal and external R&D startup costs is 1.36%, which is a 16% increase compared to be-
fore reduction where ∆ω˜ jt is 1.17%. Moreover, 70% of the gain comes from adjustment along the
external margin.29 In the model without R&D organization, one period productivity growth is just
3% more than before cost reduction.30 This additionally shows the importance of considering firm
organization in research.
In contrast to startup cost reduction, no firms will quit as a result of continuation cost reduction.
Some firms may additionally find entry attractive because the marginal benefit of research is now
higher than the startup cost. Columns (5)-(8) in Table 1.7 show results consistent with expectation.
Among firms that were not previously active in research, external R&D also attracts the most
entrants, a proportion that is comparable to that under sunk cost reduction (2.6%). Reduction in
internal continuation cost, on the other hand, attracts almost no entrants since the startup cost is
still too high. A sizable percentage of internal R&D only firms additionally take on external R&D.
Firms that do both remain active in both modes of research, and more than 50% of the firms that
29This is computed from examining the gain when only external startup cost is reduced.
30Changes in transition matrix for the model with no R&D organization is reported in Appendix 1.9.6.
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would have dropped external activities now continue.
While the net adjustments in R&D status appear to be more favorable in the case of continuation
cost reduction, aggregate productivity growth is 1.16% and even slightly lower compared to before
cost reduction. To understand why productivity gain is smaller under continuation cost, I examine
more closely the affected firms. Table 1.8 presents productivity growth from firms that changed
status as a result of the cost reduction, their revenue share in the economy and the number of these
firms as the share of the total number of firms. Panel A features firms that have either started or
managed to keep research activities after cost reduction, while B features firms that quit as a result
of startup cost reduction.
Table 1.8 shows that sunk cost reduction induces productivity gain from 5.5% of firms but
they make up 11.6% of total revenue. Firms that quit external R&D because of the option value
effect counteracts more than half of the productivity gain, but since there are only a few of them
the negative effect did not amount to any significance in the end. Continuation cost reduction
induces productivity gain from 6.9% of firms yet they make up only 1.6% of total revenue. This
suggests that while continuation reduction induced some entry, it also allowed firms less productive
in research to continue.
Table 1.7: Changes in Transition Matrix from 50% Reductions in R&D Startup and Continuation
Costs, Averaging over 100 Simulations
Reduction in Sunk Reduction in Continuation
nt et it iet nt et it iet
nt−1 -0.056 0.026 0.023 0.006 -0.036 0.026 0.008 0.003
et−1 0.014 -0.060 0.010 0.036 -0.126 0.123 -0.006 0.009
it−1 0.001 0 -0.050 0.049 -0.016 0 -0.013 0.028
iet−1 0 0 0.018 -0.018 -0.009 0 -0.078 0.087
N (%) -0.040 0.008 0.002 0.031 -0.058 0.037 -0.027 0.049
∆ω˜t 0.0136 0.0116
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Table 1.8: Summary of Productivity Gain from Affected Firms
Start Up Cost Reduction Continuation Cost Reduction
Panel A
Internal External Internal External
Productivity Growth (%) 2.73 1.96 3.01 1.97
Revenue Share (%) 2.47 9.12 0.27 1.31
Share of Firms (%) 1.96 3.56 1.39 5.52
Panel B
Internal External Internal External
Productivity Growth (%) -3.05 -1.54 N.A. N.A.
Revenue Share (%) ∼ 0 0.13 N.A. N.A.
Share of Firms (%) ∼ 0 0.62 N.A. N.A.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper estimates a dynamic structural model of firms’ R&D organization decisions with a panel
of Chinese firms to quantify the benefits and costs of R&D organization. The model is driven by
the following empirical observations: firms conduct research in house, with external units or via
a combination of both modes; there exists a pecking order in firms’ selection into research modes
by size; once an R&D mode is chosen, firms additionally transition in and out of research. To
account for these features, productivity is modeled to evolve endogenously according to firms’
internal and external R&D decisions, the costs of starting and continuing research are random and
differ by R&D modes. The existence of fixed costs select the largest firms into research and this
selection is then reinforced by the different returns to R&D, and research cost uncertainty explains
the transitions in and out of R&D modes observed in the data.
Model estimates show that in-house R&D is more effective, costs less to maintain but substan-
tially more to start than external R&D. These estimates elucidate the trade-offs between the two
research modes, and are consistent with the observed transition in R&D modes. Despite the higher
returns of in-house research smaller firms select into external R&D due to its lower startup cost.
Once a firm overcomes the startup cost to establish an in-house research team, it almost never quits.
These findings reveal the intuitions for the trade-offs firms face in organizing their R&D: internal
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R&D requires a high level of initial commitment but low fixed cost as opposed to external R&D;
internal R&D is a continuing process of investment in knowledge capacity while external R&D is
relatively short-lived.
The counter-factual exercises of reducing cost uncertainty shows that productivity growth is
2.5 times higher when firms can choose how to organize R&D, and the ability to adjust along ex-
ternal R&D contributes to almost 70% of the difference. Comparing startup versus continuation
cost reduction, I find that while continuation cost reduction leads to the most changes in research
status, startup cost reduction leads to the most productivity gain. In investigating this finding fur-
ther reveals that growth implications of cost reductions is determined by the degree of uncertainty
associated with different research modes and the initial distribution of firms’ research status and
productivity. Thus failing to take these factors into account jointly could mislead R&D policies.
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1.9 Appendix
1.9.1 Derivation of the Marginal Cost Function
Assuming firms take capital as given and the factor markets are competitive, then the firm’s input
decisions are solutions to the following problem:
min
L jt ,M jt
W jtL jt + PM jtM jt subject to F(K j, L jt,M jt) ≥ Q jt/exp(ψ jt). (1.23)
The first order conditions are
W jt = λFL
PM jt = λFM
F(K j, L jt,M jt) − Q jt/exp(ψ jt) = 0,
and they can be used to solve for the 3 unknowns:
λ = Cλ(Q jt/exp(ψ jt),W jt, PM jt,K j),
M∗jt = M(Q jt/exp(ψ jt),W jt, PM jt,K j),
L∗jt = L(Q jt/exp(ψ jt),W jt, PM jt,K j).
The total cost is
TC jt = r jtK j + C(K j,W jt, PM jt,K j,Q jt/exp(ψ jt)),
and the marginal cost is
MC jt =
∂C
∂Q jt
(K jt,W jt, PM jt,Q jt/exp(ψ jt))exp(−ψ jt). (1.24)
By Shephard’s lemma, optimal input M jt is the partial derivative of the total cost with respect to
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PM jt:
M jt =
∂C
∂PM jt
(K jt,W jt, PM jt,Q jt/exp(ψ jt)), (1.25)
which is then be inverted and used to replace Q jt/exp(ψ jt) in (1.24). Finally, we arrive at the new
marginal cost function:
MC jt = MC(K,M jt,W jt, PM jt)exp(−ψ jt), (1.26)
that gives us the empirical counterpart as in (1.3).
1.9.2 Value Function Iteration and Likelihood Function
The actual cost draws are only observable to the firm, and I work with the integrated value function
instead over the random costs to arrive at the following expression:31
EV = Π + PnδEVn + Pe(δEVe − E [Ce|e])
+ Pi(δEV i − E
[
Ci|i
]
) + Pie(δEV ie − E
[
Ci + Ce|ie
]
),
where Pn, Pe, Pi, Pie stand for the probabilities of conducting R&D via a specific mode given
the cost distribution, and E [C|·] are the conditional expectations of the cost draws.32 With the
following assumed distributions for the cost parameters (for ci > 0, ce > 0):
Ci ∼ G(ci) = 1 − exp
(
−ci/γ
)
,
Ce ∼ L(ce) = 1 − exp (−ce/λ) .
The means of the distribution for sunk and fixed costs are γF , γ f for internal R&D, and λF , λ f for
external R&D.
31To simplify notations I have suppressed the subindex for firm and time.
32Whether Ci (Ce) takes F ior f i (F eor f e) depends on previous period status. Abusing the notation a little, I use
Ci, Ce as random variables.
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The expressions for probabilities are as follows:
Pn = P(δEVn > δEVe −Ce and
δEVn > δEV i −Ci and
δEVn > δEV ie −Ci −Ce),
Pi = P(δEV i −Ci > δEVn and
δEV i −Ci > δEVe −Ce and
δEV i −Ci > δEV ie −Ci −Ce),
Pe = P(δEVe −Ce > δEVn and
δEVe −Ce > δEV i −Ci and
δEVe −Ce > δEV ie −Ci −Ce),
Pie = P(δEV ie −Ci −Ce > δEVn and
δEV ie −Ci −Ce > δEV i −Ci and
δEV ie −Ci −Ce > δEVe −Ce).
These conditions can be simplified when there is complementarity, substitutability, or neither be-
tween the two activities. When there is substitutability, the probabilities are as follows:
Pn = P(Ci > a, Ce > a′)
= [1 −G(a)][1 − L(a′)],
Pe = P(Ci > b, Ce < b′) + P(b′ < Ce < a′, Ce −Ci < −c)
= [1 −G(b)] ∗ L(b′) + k
λ
[1 −G(c)][H(a′) − H(b′)],
Pi = P(Ci < a, Ce > a′) + P(b′ < Ce < a′, Ce −Ci > −c)
= G(a) ∗ [1 − L(a′)] + L(a′) − L(b′) − k
λ
[1 −G(c)][H(a′) − H(b′)],
Pie = P(Ci < b,Ce < b′) = G(b)L(b′).
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a = δ(EV i − EVn), a′ = δ(EVe − EVn),
b = δ(EV ie − EVe), b′ = δ(EV ie − EV i),
c = δ(EV i − EVe), k = γλ
γ + λ
, H(z) = 1 − exp(−z/k),
and the probabilities for internal and external are derived by dividing integration over the non-
rectangular region into two for tractability.
The corresponding conditional expectations multiplied by the probabilities are then:
PeE[Ce|e] = Pe{E[Ce|Ci > b, Ce < b′] + E[Ce|b′ < Ce < a′, Ce −Ci < −c]}
=
∫ ∞
b
∫ b′
0
cel(ce)g(ci)dcedci +
∫ a′
b′
∫ ∞
ce+c
cel(ce)g(ci)dcedci
= [1 −G(b)][L(b′)(b′ + λ) − b′]
+
k
λ
[1 −G(c)]{[1 − H(b′)](b′ + k) − [1 − H(a′)](a′ + k)},
PiE[Ci|i] = Pi{E[Ci|Ci < a, Ce > a′] + E[Ci|b′ < Ce < a′, Ce −Ci > −c]}
=
∫ ∞
a′
∫ a
0
cig(ci)l(ce)dcidce +
∫ a′
b′
∫ ce+c
0
cig(ci)l(ce)dcidce
= [1 − L(a′)][G(a)(a + γ) − a]
− k
λ
[1 −G(c)]{[1 − H(b′)](b′ + k) − [1 − H(a′)](a′ + k)}
− c + γ
λ
k[1 −G(c)][H(a′) − H(b′)] + γ[L(a′) − L(b′)]
PieE[Ci + Ce|ie] = Pie{E[Ci|Ci < b, Ce < b′] + E[Ce|Ci < b, Ce < b′]}
= L(b′)[G(b)(b + γ) − b] + G(b)[L(b′)(b′ + λ) − b′].
33In case of complementarity, the diagonal cut off is m = δ(EV ie − EVn)
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In the case of complementarity, the probabilities and conditional expectations are:
Pn = P(Ci > b, Ce > a′) + P(a′ < Ce < b′, Ce + Ci > m)
= [1 −G(b)][1 − L(a′)] + k
′
λ
[1 −G(m)][H′(b′) − H′(a′)],
Pe = P(Ci > b, Ce < a′)
= [1 −G(b)]L(a′),
Pi = P(Ci < a, Ce > b′)
= G(a)[1 − L(b′)],
Pie = P(Ci < b, Ce < a′) + P(a′ < Ce < b′, Ce + Ci < m)
= G(b)L(a′) + L(b′) − L(a′) − k
′
λ
[1 −G(m)][H′(b′) − H′(a′)],
k′ =
γλ
γ − λ, H
′(z) = 1 − exp(z/k′)
PeE[Ce|e] = Pe{E[Ce|Ci > b, Ce < a′]}
=
∫ ∞
b
∫ a′
0
cel(ce)g(ci)dcedci = [1 −G(b)][L(a′)(a′ + λ) − a′],
PiE[Ci|i] = Pi{E[Ci|Ci < a, Ce > b′]}
=
∫ ∞
b′
∫ a
0
cig(ci)l(ce)dcidce = [1 − H(b′)][G(a)(a + γ) − a],
PieE[Ci + Ce|ie] = Pie{E[Ci + Ce|Ci < b, Ce < a′] + E[Ci + Ce|a′ < Ce < b′, Ce + Ci < m]}
=
∫ a′
0
∫ b
0
cig(ci)l(ce)dcidce +
∫ b
0
∫ a′
0
cel(ce)g(ci)dcedci
=
∫ a′
b′
∫ m−Ce
0
cig(ci)l(ce)dcidce +
∫ a′
b′
∫ m−Ce
0
ceg(ci)l(ce)dcidce
= G(b)[L(a′)(a′ + λ) − a′] + L(b′)[G(b)(b + γ) − b]
+ (γ + λ)[L(b′) − L(a′)] + a′[1 − L(a′)] − b′[1 − L(b′)]
− (m + γ)
λ
k′[1 −G(m)][H′(b′) − H′(a′)].
39
Under exponential shocks but restricting substitutability or complementarity, the integrated
value function is instead:
EV = Π + [1 −G(p)][1 − H(q)]δEVn + G(p)[1 − H(q)]δEV i
+ [1 −G(p)]H(q)δEVe + G(p)H(q)δEV ie
+ p[1 −G(p)] + q[1 − H(q)] − γG(p) − λH(q),
where
p = δEV i − δEVn,
q = δEVe − δEVn.
One of the features of the exponential distribution is that its truncation has a nice form that
allows one to simplify the expressions for the value functions. For a given set of cost parameters,
one can numerically solve for V that is made up of Vn, Ve, V i, V ie, each is 100 (ω) by 10 (k) grids.
With the value functions, one can proceed to construct the joint likelihood function.
1.9.3 Bayesian MCMC Estimation
Rather than assuming θ is fixed and using MLE to obtain their point estimates:
p(θ|y) ∝ p(y|θ),
I use the Bayesian approach; treat θ as a random variable to maximize the posterior distribution
instead:
p(θ|y) = p(y|θ)p(θ)
p(y)
∝ p(y|θ)p(θ).
With a diffuse prior for θ, I update with the data to form posterior beliefs about the parameters
using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
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The basic idea of the M-H algorithm is to take simulated draws that are slightly dependent and
are approximately from a posterior distribution. The hope is when the chain runs long enough it
converges to the stationary distribution. I implement the algorithm as follows:
1. Diffuse priors: P(θ) ∼ N(0, 1000) or N(0, 100); 30 sets of random starting values θ0.
2. For simulations i = 1 to 10000, draw a candidate θ∗ from J(θi|θi−1) and accept with probabil-
ity r = min
( q(θ∗)L(X|θ∗)
q(θt−1)L(X|θi−1) , 1
)
. If not accepted, set θi as θi−1.
3. The jumping distribution is a random walk and symmetric: J(θi|θi−1) = θi−1 + randi ∗ step,
where randi ∼ N(0, 1) and step is the parameter-specific step size.
1.9.4 Alternative Model Specifictaion
Instead of assuming independent cost draws, one can estimate the cost variables as fixed parameters
and have the cost shocks as correlated draws from a bivariate normal distribution Φ(εi, εe) with
mean zero, correlation ρ and the covariance matrix:
Σ =
 σ
2
i ρσiσe
ρσiσe σ
2
e

The new Bellman equation (counter part to (1.8)) is then
V¯(s jt) =
∫

Π(s jt) + max
i jt ,e jt

δEV¯n,
−Ce + εe + δEV¯e,
−Ci + εi + δEV¯ i,
−Ci −Ce + εe + εi + δEV¯ ie


dΦ(), (1.27)
and the integrated value function is:
EV = Π + PnδEVn + Pe(δEVe −Ce + E [εe|e])
+ Pi(δEV i −Ci + E
[
εi|i
]
) + Pie(δEV ie −Ci −Ce + E
[
εi + εe|ie
]
),
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It is important to note that εi, εe also depend on a firm’s previous period status, so each is a
vector of two variables, one for start up cost shock and the other for maintenance. This implies that
the there are a total of four different variances as well as correlations in total.
Under this specification, I have restricted the the interaction term between internal and exter-
nal R&D in the Markov process (αie) to be zero, and instead let the correlation coefficient in the
cost shocks pick up correlations between the cost draws that could alternatively be interpreted as
economies of scope. The updated figure as a result of the restriction of αie = 0 is now:
where
p = δEV¯n − (δEV¯ i −Ci)
q = δEV¯n − (δEV¯e −Ce)
This specification is attractive since one can take advantage of the Cholesky decomposition to
uncorrelate the cost draws. This makes the problem tractable as the probabilities and the conditional
expectations will be much simpler as a result. More specifically, call the transformed variable
 = Cε, one needs a matrix C such that the transformed ε has mean 0 and variance I2, which means
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the candidate C must be such that CΣC = I2. The Cholesky decomposition of Σ is Σ = U′U:
 σi 0ρσe σe(1 − ρ2)1/2

 σi ρσe0 σe(1 − ρ2)1/2

And the natural candidate for C is U′−1.
To proceed with the estimation, I first pre-multiply the cutoffs p, q with U′−1 so that (εi, εe)
are now independent standard normal bivariate variables. I evaluate the conditional expectations
correspondingly and then rescale the expectation by pre-multiplying it with U′. One can then
proceed to solve for the value function by iteration, and then estimate the parameters using Baysian
MCMC.
In the end, the set of parameters under this alternative model consists of the four costs and the
variance of each of the costs (Panel A of Table 1.9), and the correlation between them (Panel B of
Table 1.9).
Table 1.9: Dynamic Parameter Estimates under Alternative Specification
(1) (2)
parameters mean SE
(mil.RMB)
Internal γF 655.1 (0.792)
γ f 1.67 (0.005)
σ(εγF ) 6.69
σ(εγ f ) 7.94
External λF 71.7 (0.718)
λ f 5.46 (0.094)
σ(ελF ) 20.62
σ(ελ f ) 19.58
Correlation
ελF ελ f
εγF -0.2336 0.0065
εγ f 0.1183 -0.0501
In 2002, 1USD≈8RMB. SE in parentheses.
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The estimates for internal and external startup and continuation costs are close to those un-
der the baseline model, but the shocks associated with external R&D activities have much higher
variance. I next examine the correlations among the cost shocks. There is a negative correlation be-
tween internal and external startup costs, this supports the observation in the data that firms rarely
start both types of research at once. The correlations between internal continuation (startup) and
external startup (continuation) costs are positive, but close to zero for the latter combination. This
may serve as preliminary evidence that firms with an in-house team may have an incentive to start
external R&D and vice versa. Lastly, the correlation between internal and external continuation
costs is negative but close to zero. This is in line with the empirical finding that the two activities
serve as substitutes for firms that are active in research.
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1.9.5 Robustness Checks
1.9.5.1 Pecking Order by R&D Mode
Table 1.10: The Pecking Order by R&D Mode is Robust
lnsales lnK Productivity New Proc New Prod Patents
1(e jt−2 = 1) 0.641*** 0.423** 0.360** 0.562*** 0.626*** 0.445**
(0.184) (0.201) (0.150) (0.144) (0.145) (0.181)
1(i jt−2 = 1) 1.092*** 0.943*** 0.717*** 0.561*** 0.744*** 0.520***
(0.128) (0.131) (0.0968) (0.0931) (0.0943) (0.119)
1(ie jt−2 = 1) 1.608*** 1.517*** 0.977*** 1.207*** 1.457*** 0.987***
(0.166) (0.169) (0.124) (0.116) (0.125) (0.130)
Constant 7.072*** 13.48*** 7.034*** -0.925*** -0.896*** -1.894***
(0.321) (0.298) (0.222) (0.233) (0.227) (0.309)
N 1266 1266 1266 1260 1260 1266
R2(PseudoR2) 0.382 0.353 0.320 (0.127) (0.194) (0.130)
Coefficients on year, industry, city, exporter and state-owned status omitted. Robust standard error
clustered by firms. Depvars: Productivity is Levihnson & Petrin type of estimator with an exogenous
first order Markov process; New Proc, New Prod, and Patents are indicator variables for whether
firms introduced new process, product or held patents.In all regressions R&D modes are jointly
significant; in the last three columns e jt−2 is not statistically different from i jt−2. This last
finding suggests both R&D structures contribute significantly to innovation success, regardless of
whether it is a new product or a new process.
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1.9.5.2 Alternative Estimation Strategy for the Productivity Process
One can alternatively estimate the productivity process in a one-step procedure. This is possible
with either a nonparametric or parametric control function for ω jt. In what follows, I adopt the
strategy under the assumption that the production function is Cobb-Douglas.
When the production function is Cobb-Douglas, the exact expression for ω jt, or the inverted
h−1(·) is:34
ω jt ≡ h−1(k jt,m jt) ≡ κ′ + δ′t − βkk jt + m jt. (1.28)
Lagging (1.28) one period and substituting it for the Markov process for ω jt−1 as specified in (1.6)
gives:
ω jt = α0 + α1(κ′ + δ′t − βkk jt + m jt) + αii jt−1 + αee jt−1 + αiei jt−1 ∗ e jt−1 + ξ jt (1.29)
The updated revenue is now35
r jt = const. + βtt + (η − 1)βkk jt + (η − 1)α1
[
βkk jt−1 + m jt−1
]
(1.30)
+ (η − 1)αii jt−1 + (η − 1)αee jt−1 + (η − 1)αiei jt−1 ∗ e jt−1 + (η − 1)ξ jt,
and the parameters in the Markov process can be estimated in one-step using NLS.
The results are summarized in 1.11. For comparison purposes, I also include the results from
the two-step estimation procedure in Column (1). The qualitative feature of the estimates are
preserved compared with the case of two-step estimation procedure. Internal R&D is more effective
than external R&D and the interaction of the two modes is not significant. However, the persistence
parameter (α1) is reduced significantly. Notice also that the constant term in the Markov process
cannot be separately estimated from that in the revenue function under the one-step procedure.
34κ′ = η
η−1 ln
η
η−1 − βl ln βl + βl(η−1)−ηη−1 ln βm, δ′t = − 1η−1 ln Φt + βlwt − (η−1)βl−ηη−1 pmt .
35κ = −(η − 1) ln η
η−1 + (η − 1)βl ln βl + (η − 1)βm ln βm, δt = ln Φt − (η − 1)βlwt − (η − 1)βmpmt .
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Table 1.11: Estimation Results of the Markov Process for Productivity
Baseline (2) (3)
η 4.871**
(0.143)
βk 0.070*** 0.051***
(0.015) (0.004)
α0 0.120***
(0.018)
α1 0.945*** 0.168***
(0.011) (0.004)
αe 0.021** 0.064***
(0.10) (0.019)
αi 0.026*** 0.072***
(0.007) (0.012)
αie -0.008 -0.019
(0.516) (0.023)
Constant 0.120*** 2.649***
(0.018) (0.137)
Obs 2531 2531 2406
Bootstrapped standard errors in parametheses in Columns (1) & (2).
Column (3) contains the estimation results of the profit function.
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1.9.5.3 Static and Dynamic Estimates with Controls for Heterogeneity
Table 1.12: Dynamic Parameter Estimates with Controls for Heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
parameters distribution mean realized mean
∑ R∑
R
C
R
∑ Π∑
Π
C
Π
(mil.RMB) (mil. RMB)
Full Model
Internal γF 334.3 22.9 0.17 1.37
(31.986) (4.796)
γ f 1.62 1.59 0.010 0.066
(0.081 ) (0.066)
External λF 142.46 16.8 0.079 0.428
( 21.549) (2.440)
λ f 3.98 2.44 0.018 0.112
(0.085) ( 0.206)
Model without R&D Organization
Startup Cost 142.46 16.8 0.079 0.428
Continuation Cost 3.98 2.44 0.018 0.112
In 2002, 1USD≈8RMB. SE in brackets.
1.9.6 Additional Analysis
Table 1.13: Transition and Aggregate Productivity from 50% Reductions in R&D Costs, Computed
from 100 Simulations
Reduction in Reduction in
Startup Cost Cont. Cost
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RDt ω¯ k¯ RDt ω¯ k¯
nt−1 +0.040 2.690 16.4 +0.026 2.634 16
RDt−1 -0.004 - - +0.028 - -
N (%) +0.030 - - +0.050 - -
Chapter 2
Innovation and Prices (with Jordi Jaumandreu)
2.1 Introduction
This paper investigates the impact of process and product innovations on the output prices set by
firms. It uses prices reported over an extended period of time by a sample of manufacturing firms.
We assume prices are set with reference to (short run) marginal cost and hence they have to reflect
variations in efficiency of production, both across firms and over time. Productivity, in turn, shifts
with the introduction of process and product innovations by firms.
Models almost universally assume firms set prices with reference to marginal cost, although
also recognize that optimal markups over marginal costs can vary with a host of factors such as the
type and intensity of competition, firm behavior, the state of the market, and dynamic considera-
tions.1 Marginal cost, both in the short and long run, depends on firm-level productivity, and hence
evolves according to the firm’s innovation activities and, in particular, the introduction of process
and product innovations. This level of productivity is usually considered heterogeneous and unob-
served, something to be measured together with the impact that process and product innovations
have on it.2 Process innovations, aimed at reducing cost, are expected to shift the marginal cost
function downwards. The introduction of product innovations (improved or new goods) are ex-
pected to change cost in more heterogeneous ways. Quality upgrades of the goods may sometimes
1This is a consequence of profit maximization, which implies that marginal revenue should equal marginal cost. Hall
and Hitch (1939) is a departure from this view, in what Ellison (2006) characterizes as an early contribution to behavioral
industrial organization.
2The literature on estimating heterogeneous unobserved productivity with structural methods starts with Olley and
Pakes (1996); see also Levinsohn and Petrin (2003b) and Ackerberg et al. (2006). Latest models allow productivity to
be endogenously determined. Peters et al. (2013), for example, model firms’ marginal cost as depending on process and
product innovation in the way that we are going to adopt in this paper. Aw et al. (2011) and Doraszelski and Jaumandreu
(2013) are papers in which endogenous efficiency depends on R&D expenditure.
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imply less unobserved productivity, at least temporarily.3,4
The final impact of innovation on prices is then something that depends on two very different
mechanisms. The first is how innovations affect marginal cost as described above. The second is
how firms translate the variations in marginal costs to prices, and specifically how the changes in
cost due to innovations are passed onto prices. Although theory offers some guidance on how these
processes are expected to work, it is something mainly to be investigated empirically.
Without changes in prices, markups would be continuously eroded by the increase in costs and
subjected to more discrete and heterogeneous changes due to the impact of process and product
innovations on costs. With prices fixed we expect process innovations to enlarge margins and
product innovations to either increase or decrease them; there two additional important mechanisms
by which innovation can affect margins.
On the one hand, innovations are likely to enlarge the demand for the product of the firm and
maybe modify the price sensitivity of the clients with respect to the good. This seems particularly
likely for product innovations, but it could be also true for process innovations.
On the other hand, innovation induced changes on demand in principle give firms incentives to
continuously adapt prices to their profit maximizing levels. But a huge literature on price changes
has given many reasons for which firm-level prices may show inertia5 and shown it to be empir-
ically relevant.6 This literature has considered fixed and variable costs of price adjustment and
3For example, the new production may require new labor skills and material qualities not fully accounted for in the
observable part of cost. And, when “learning by doing” is important, firms may lack experience in producing the new
good and unobserved productivity goes down as a result.
4In addition, as most firms are in practice multiproduct, product innovations often only modify the product mix and
their impact on cost are expected to be generally milder.
5Economists have discussed the rigidity of prices and its consequences at least since Berle and Means (1932). Models
of adjustment costs in prices at the firm level were advanced, for example, in the works of Barro (1972) and Sheshinski
and Weiss (1977, 1992) with lumpy costs generating inaction, and in Rotemberg (1982) with strictly convex costs
generating partial adjustment. Carlton (1985) discusses the issue of price rigidity from the point of view of industrial
organization in the first IO Handbook. A recent contribution to the theory of rigid prices (in the presence of collusion)
is Athey and Bagwell (2008).
6Early works described the micro price-setting of particular industries and cases, e.g. Cechetti (1986), Carlton
(1986), Slade (1991), Lach and Tsiddon (1992) and Kashyap (1995). Slade (1998) and Aguirregabiria (1999) are full
structural dynamic models that estimate firm-level fixed and variable adjustment costs. Newer evidence has incorpo-
rated interindustry studies and surveys on price setting. Reviews of the extensive accumulated evidence can be found
in Álvarez et al. (2006) for Europe and Klenow and Malin (2010) for the US. Two recent studies using respectively
industry and firm-level data are Goldberg and Hellerstein (2011) and Eichenbaum et al. (2011). The latest is part of a
huge literature that combines detailed micro-evidence with the macro discussion of the neutrality of money. A recent
contribution of this kind is Midrigan (2011).
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developed models for both discrete and level changes in different situations. The costs of changing
prices could refer to menu costs, costs of convincing customers the necessity of the new prices, and
perhaps dynamic considerations on future demand.
No literature, at least not to our knowledge, has explored the role that process and product
innovation may play on the costs of adjusting prices but it is clear that it can be very important.
When process innovations reduce marginal costs they also reduce the cost of updating the margin,
because it can be redressed without changing price or changing it by a smaller amount. Implement-
ing product innovations may imply important differences in the cost of changing prices (because,
for example, the different client’s information requirements when the product is new). In other
words, process and product innovations become state variables of the dynamic problem of prices.
All the above makes a very strong simplification to consider that margins are constant, as they
were in a permanent long-run equilibrium. But still more important is to recognize that ignoring the
markup changes due to innovations is likely to induce an important bias in the estimated impacts
of process and product innovations on prices and costs and other variables that involve price or
price and cost. Intuitively, we may be leaving in the residuals changes in the margins that are
correlated with process and product innovations. For example, this paper finds that when process
innovations decrease costs there is an incomplete pass through to prices, and firms enlarge their
margins as a result. This may explain the insignificant impact of process innovation on prices in
an OLS framework, and can also explain the weak effects that researchers get for the impact of
process innovation on "revenue" productivity.7
The model that we develop in this paper takes advantage of the fact that we (imperfectly)
observe both margins and prices.8 It specifies the (log) margin over marginal cost as the result of
a dynamic decision of the firm. We show that, given the rest of relevant variables, choosing an
optimal price is the same as choosing an optimal markup. So in the model the firm directly decides
7In principle longer firm-level series should be able to deal satisfactorily with these problems, but typical panel data
sets are still just characterized by few time observations for each individual.
8On the one hand, we have firm-level price indices, on the other we estimate the markup as the scale parameter times
the the price-average cost margin: ν RC = ν
P
AC , where R is revenue, C are variable costs, P is price and AC is average
cost. This is an alternative to estimate markup in the older IO literature recently revisited by De Loecker and Warzynski
(2012).
51
if it wants to update the value of the margin and by how much. To do this, the firm weighs the
profits against the costs of changing the margin.9 The cost of adjusting the margin is specified as
a function of its level, the state of the demand for the product, whether the firm has introduced a
process or product innovation and other state variables. The implication of the model for reduced-
form estimation is that the margin is likely to follow a first order Markov process that also takes
into consideration the roles of all the state variables, observed and unobserved.
Then we nest this margin in a structural equation that gives account of (log) price as the result of
both the evolving markup and the marginal cost of the firm. Marginal cost is modeled as the result
of observable variables and unobserved productivity, the latter specified as an endogenous Markov
process which depends on the introduction of process and product innovations. We estimate the
model as a nonlinear simultaneous system with two dependent variables (margin and price) and
cross-equation restrictions on the parameters. We estimate two versions of the model. In one,
there are no adjustment costs of prices and the firm sets the markup according to the elasticity of
demand (as impacted by cyclical changes and innovations). In the other, the markups follow the
law of motion derived from the dynamic model. In this version we only have implicit demand
"equivalent" elasticities, or elasticities that would determine the same markup that we see under
optimal dynamic pricing.
Our basic model considers the short-run marginal cost proportional to average variable cost
(that is, the short-run parameter of elasticity of scale is constant) and hence takes the choice of
the firm as the choice of its price-average cost margin up to a constant. It can be argued that the
observed price-average cost margin ignores some relevant components of marginal cost, such as
the adjustment costs of labor. Conversely, it could be argued that the relevant marginal cost for
the firm to set the markup over should not include short-run cyclical components.10 One important
advantage of our approach is that we can test for the relevant marginal cost by including in our
9The costs of changing the margin are the costs of changing the price when this change is needed plus some specific
costs. For example, an increased margin may augment the cost of dealing with the retributions of profits among managers
and workers.
10It has been argued that firm set prices with an optimal markup on "reference" marginal costs, whose time variation
is less frequent than the very short-run marginal costs. E.g., Eichenbaum et al. (2011) provides empirical evidence for
this price setting behavior of a major US retailer.
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specifications the relevant corrections to the observed price-average cost margin. Our conclusion
is that labor adjustment costs are a relevant part of marginal cost.
There are at least three reasons for the interest in the details of the impact of innovation on
prices. First of all, how technological change via firm-level innovation transmits to prices is rele-
vant for understanding the working of many economic forces. For example, prices play a crucial
role in the allocation of resources and thus growth. When a process innovation induces a price
decrease, market demand for the good is expected to increase. As a result, the demand for inputs
required for production is expected to increase by more than what is needed to compensate for any
input displacement provoked by technology. However, the magnitude and how complete, rapid and
heterogeneous is this mechanism is something to be assessed empirically.
Second, the analysis of what is in firm-level prices is important for addressing many key ques-
tions of productivity measurement. The quantities used in productivity analysis are, almost without
exception, obtained by deflating firm revenue by a price index. When an industry-wide index is
used, it has been argued that it leaves out the difference between the firm-level and the general
indices and one may get biased estimates as a result.11 In fact, revenue conditional on inputs and
their prices may not contain any information on productivity.12 This clearly contrasts with the host
of estimates of productivity that find productivity growth using revenue deflated by a non firm-level
price index. An explanation for these results is that productivity is not instantaneously passed onto
prices. When this is the case, revenue conditional on inputs and their prices is no longer invariant
to productivity.13
Lastly, how well prices reflect productivity improvements is important for the measurement
of welfare. On the one hand, if prices do not accurately reflect technical efficiency improvements
then the analysis of the increases in consumer surplus coming from innovation becomes more
11This problem was firstly pointed out by Klette and Griliches (1996). Later, it has been at least addressed by ?,
Loecker (2011) and Katayama et al. (2009), who propose different ways to deal with it.
12Let’s consider for simplicity the case of constant returns to scale. Production function is Q = F(x)eω,whereω stands
for idiosyncratic productivity and F shows CRTS. Cost is C = c(w)Qe−ω, where w represents prices, and marginal cost
MC = c(w)e−ω.Under a markup η
η−1 , revenue is R = PQ =
η
η−1 c(w)e
−ωF(x)eω = η
η−1 c(w)F(x), so conditional on inputs
and their prices it does not depend on productivity.
13Suppose that at a given moment price is P = η
η−1 c(w)e
−θω, where θ < 1 reflects the partial transmission of produc-
tivity to prices. Now revenue is R = η
η−1 c(w)F(x)e
(1−θ)ω.
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difficult. By the same token we can have prices that do not properly reflect product novelty. There
is an ongoing literature that studies how the methods applied by Statistical Offices with respect
to new goods may impact welfare measurements.14 One relevant dimension of this problem is to
understand how firms price product improvements in practice.
To estimate our model we use the prices reported over an extended period of time (17 years)
by a sample of Spanish manufacturing firms. We use data on ten (unbalanced panel) industry
samples, which in total amount to more than 2,300 manufacturing firms and 17,000 observations,
corresponding to the period 1990-2006. We have firm-level price indices for each firm, constructed
from the reported yearly output price increases in the main market, we observe the timing of the
process and product innovations introduced by firms, and we have the relevant information to
construct margins, output and input use.
Preliminary GMM estimates show a good fit of the most general model. Margins show inertia
but tend to change procyclically with the state of the market. Importantly, firms tend to take ad-
vantage of process innovations to enlarge margins by not passing onto prices the decrease in cost.
Product innovations, instead, do not affect margins. Our model cannot detect if this is the effect of
product innovations not affecting the elasticity of demand or the firm’s reluctance to modify mar-
gins when new products are introduced. On the other hand, process innovations unambiguously
increase productivity and thus decrease cost. Product innovations are on average associated with
productivity increases but by amounts that are less than those associated with process innovations.
Consequently, the reductions in cost as a result are not as big and, for some industries, product inno-
vations increase cost. Compared with the simplest model, our dynamic specification gives sharper
cost reducing effects of process innovations and more complex effects of product innovations.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we lay out the econometric model under static
and dynamic pricing. In Section 3, we focus on the method of estimation for the model of dynamic
pricing. Section 4 discusses the data and Section 5 presents the estimation results. Finally Section
6 concludes.
14See, for example, Pakes (2003).
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2.2 Model
In this section, we first lay out the econometric model that gives rise to a general system of equa-
tions that describes the structural link of prices, productivity and innovation. The identification
of these equations is then discussed, but their exact specifications depend on whether there exists
static or dynamic pricing or not. Thus the rest of the section is devoted to deriving the system of
estimable equations under either scenario.
2.2.1 The Structural Link of Prices, Productivity and Innovation
We assume that firm j operates in a monopolistically competitive market and sets the price of its
product with a markup on (short-run) marginal cost.15 How large is the firm demand at given
price may differ according to exogenous and endogenous shifters that we discuss later in detail.16
Let’s write demand for the moment as Q jt = Q(P∗jt,Z jt), where Q jt and P
∗
jt represent quantity and
(unobserved) price and Z jt is a vector of shifters. We assume that the researcher observes price
with an error (see below).
The firm knows its cost function. We assume that the firm production function is
Q jt = F(K jt, L jt,M jt) exp(ω jt),
where K jt, L jt, and M jt stand for capital, labor and materials, and ω jt represents the Hicks neutral
level of efficiency of firm j. Following the literature we call ω jt productivity, and it is observed by
the firm but unobservable for the econometrician. The firm minimizes cost of labor and materials
given capital, W jtL jt + PM jtM jt, where W jt and PM jt are the prices of labor and materials. Variable
cost minimization implies the existence of the function C jt = C(K jt,W jt, PM jt,Q jt/ exp(ω jt)) and
15By monopolistic competition we understand that each firm faces a downward-sloping demand for its product, makes
no profit in the long run equilibrium, and a price change by one firm has only a negligible effect on the demand of any
other firm (Tirole, 1989).
16Later we are going to consider the following shifters: an index of industry prices PIt, the state of the demand for the
product of the firm D jt and the introduction of process and product innovations z jt and d jt.
55
marginal cost can be written as
MC jt = MC(X jt) exp(−ω jt), (1)
where X jt = {K jt,M jt,W jt, PM jt} is a vector of observable variables (see Appendix A). Cost mini-
mization given capital implies MC jt = 1εL jt+εM jt AC jt, where εL jt and εM jt are the output elasticities
of labor and materials. We assume that the short-run parameter of scale ν = εL jt + εM jt is constant
and less than unity.
The firm sets price by choosing the optimal markup over marginal cost µ jt =
P∗jt
MC jt
. Under our
assumptions, profits at time t can be written as a function of the markup given capital, productivity,
input prices and shifters:17
pi jt = R jt −C jt =
(µ jt
ν
− 1
)
C(K jt,W jt, PM jt,Q(µ jt,Z jt,K jt,W jt, PM jt , ω jt)/ exp(ω jt))
= pi(µ jt,K jt,W jt, PM jt,Z jt, ω jt).
The problem of choosing the optimal price given the rest of the variables can be therefore set,
without loss of generality, as a problem of deciding the optimal markup. We will later find this fact
very useful for the specification of the dynamic model. We are going to assume that observed price
meets the relationship
P jt = P∗jt exp(e jt) = µ jtMCit exp(e jt), (2)
where e jt is a measurement error orthogonal to all information available when the firm takes the
decisions.18
17The markup µ jt =
P∗jt
MC jt
= ν
P(Q jt ,Z jt)Q jt
C(K jt ,W jt ,PM jt ,Q jt/ exp(ω jt))
is a monotonic function of Q jt given the rest of variables, and the
inverse function Qit = Q(µ jt,Z jt,K jt,W jt, PM jt , ω jt) exists. Monotonocity holds because the derivative
∂µ jt
∂Q jt
= − µ jtQ jt ( 1η jt +
1
ν
− 1), where η jt stands for the (absolute value of) elasticity of demand, is negative for any positive markup.
18An important part of the literature on prices has shown that prices tend to follow a framework that can be seen as
"reference" prices responding to "reference" costs. Although the underlying rule is quite inertial, prices tend to vary
frequently in the short run. For a recent example see Eichenbaum et al. (2011) on prices from a large US supermarket
retailer. In our paper, by means of the disturbance e jt we could extend our model to additionally allow for sundry factors
that are unexpected at the time of setting the price. In this extension the demand should be modified to be a function of
P jt rather than P∗jt.
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Our interest lies in endogenous productivity, or productivity that grows as the result of the
firms’ innovation efforts.19 We assume, as in the subsequent literature to ?, that ω jt follows a first
order Markov process and we model productivity as depending on past productivity and the shifts
induced by the introduction of process and product innovations.20 That is,
ω jt = g(ω jt−1, z jt, d jt) + ξ jt, (3)
where z jt and d jt are indicators of the process and product innovations introduced by firm j, g is
an unknown function aimed at picking up both the path dependence of productivity as well as the
unknown impact of the innovations, and ξ jt is a random innovation mean-independent of all the
arguments of g(·). Here we specify z jt and d jt to affect productivity contemporaneously but in fact
this is an empirical issue and we are going to experiment with these variables lagged as well.
Inserting (3) in (1) and (1) in (2) and taking logs we have our structural model linking prices to
innovation:
p jt = ln µ jt + mc(X jt) − g(ω jt−1, z jt, d jt) − ξ jt + e jt. (4)
This equation shows that we expect prices to structurally evolve according to productivity and
innovation. But also that we will only be able to pick up this relationship as long as we adequately
control for endogenous markups and the observable part of marginal cost.
Estimation of equation (4) presents two main difficulties from the point of view of estimation:
neither lagged productivity ω jt−1 nor the markup µ jt are directly observable. Now we detail how
we deal with these two problems.
Unobserved productivity
Unobservable lagged productivity ω jt−1 is interrelated with the observables z jt and d jt. In addition
ω jt−1 is likely to be correlated with most of the explanatory variables. In order to estimate the
19The endogenous productivity literature models productivity shifting with the R&D activities of firms. See, for
example, Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013); Aw et al. (2011); Peters et al. (2013) and Boler, Moxnes and Ullveit-Moe
(2015).
20This is also the specification used in Peters et al. (2013).
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model we will employ an Olley and Pakes (1996) type of procedure, replacing the unobservable
ω jt−1 by an expression in terms of observables. We discuss several alternatives in Appendix B
and the implementation below. Let us write in general ω jt−1 = f (Z jt−1), noticing that the set
Z jt−1 changes with the different alternatives. The estimable model can now be written as
p jt = ln µ jt + mc(X jt) − g( f (Z jt−1), z jt, d jt) − ξ jt + e jt.
Markup estimation
On the other hand, we cannot address in general the estimation of the markup inside this equation
without incurring serious problems of identification. For example, if d jt and z jt affect the markup
then these variables enter two parts of the equation. As a result, the productivity impact of these
variables cannot be separated from their role in determining the margin. However, under our as-
sumptions, we have an observed variable that differs from µ jt only by a constant and an uncorrelated
error. That is, we know from equation (2) that
ln
R jt
C jt
≡ ln P jt
AC jt
= − ln ν + ln µ jt + e jt. (5)
Let’s write ln µ jt = h(Y jt) + ε jt where h(·) is the expectation of (log) markup conditional on the set
of observed variables Y jt. This implies that we can estimate the system
r jt − c jt = − ln ν + h(Y jt) + ε jt + e jt
p jt = h(Y jt) + mc(X jt) − g( f (Z jt−1), z jt, d jt) − ξ jt + ε jt + e jt,
where r jt and c jt are the logs of revenue and variable cost. We can impose the equality of h(·)
across equations.21 We will later see that set of variables Y jt is going to be a subset of the union of
the sets X jt and Z jt plus an exogenous variable describing the state of demand for the products of
the firm.
21The constant implicit in h(·), however, cannot be estimated separately from any other constant in the equations.
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2.2.2 Identification
We have developed the model with a minimum of functional form or distributional assumptions.
Is the model identified at this level of generality? To answer this question notice first that the set
X jt contains only one endogenous variable, the input quantity M jt, and the set Z jt−1 none. M jt is
the only variable that is determined once the innovation ξ jt is known. All the rest of the variables
are likely to be correlated with productivity but, once the predictable part of productivity has been
specified in terms of observables, it only remains unobserved the value of the innovation ξ jt. This
innovation is only revealed after the values of these variables have been chosen. This is true for
the innovation variables because they are the (partly random) outcome of past R&D investments.
And this is true for the input prices under the assumption that they are determined in competitive
markets and hence given for the firm.
Do we have instruments for M jt? The answer is yes, but the available instruments depend on
the alternative Z jt−1 sets. Appendix B identifies two possible alternatives to substitute for ω jt−1:
the inverted demand for an input (materials, say) and the inverted production function. If we are
replacing ω jt−1 by the inverted conditional demand for materials, a natural instrument for M jt is
L jt−1. Variable L jt−1 is excluded from the inverted conditional demand, so it doesn’t appear in
the equation, and according to the model is correlated with M jt−1 and hence M jt. If we are using
the inverted production function, two natural instruments are the lagged input prices W jt−1 and
PM jt−1. With this kind of substitution there are no input prices in the expression that replaces
ω jt−1 and lagged input prices are, however, related to M jt. Since M jt is correlated to M jt−1, it is
also correlated with the lagged prices that determine M jt−1 . The model is hence identified in very
general conditions. In practice we use a particular parametric specification that makes identification
straightforward.
2.2.3 Static and Dynamic Pricing
We consider different hypothesis for the choice of µ jt. First, we assume that the choice of the
markup is a static problem. Up to our knowledge all empirical exercises on productivity estimation
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have used explicitly or implicitly this assumption. Then, we consider that the choice of the optimal
markup as a dynamic problem due to the presence of adjustment cost of prices.
Static Pricing
If the firm maximizes current profits the solution to the optimal µ jt has the form µ jt =
η jt
η jt−1 , where
η jt is the elasticity of demand.22 The model can be written as
r jt − c jt = − ln ν + ln η(Y jt)
η(Y jt) − 1 + ε jt + e jt
p jt = ln
η(Y jt)
η(Y jt) − 1 + mc(X jt) − g( f (Z jt−1), z jt, d jt) − ξ jt + ε jt + e jt. (6)
The firm sets the markup according to the elasticity of demand. This is a model that can be taken
to the data by specifying the elasticity as a function of the relevant variables. For example, in
the empirical exercise we consider that Y jt = {D jt, z jt, d jt}, where in addition of the innovation
dummies we include the indicator D jt of the state of the firm market.
Dynamic Pricing
There is a large micro and macro literature that considers that setting prices is subject to adjustment
costs and hence the resulting prices should be envisaged as the optimal solution of a dynamic
problem. Stemming from this tradition we consider costs of adjusting the markup µ jt and specify
it as the result of a dynamic optimization problem. The adjustment costs of markup include the
costs of adjusting prices but are somewhat different, since the markup can change even if the price
does not change. In what follows we derive the law of motion for markup under the implications
of dynamic pricing.
Now we need to be specific about the demand shifters Z jt. Demand for the product of the firm
depends on its price, prices in the industry, the state of the market, product innovations and (maybe)
22 ∂pi jt
∂µ jt
= 1
ν
C jt + (
µ jt
ν
− 1) ∂C jt
∂Q jt
∂Q jt
∂µ jt
= 1
ν
C jt − ( µ jtν − 1)
∂C jt
∂Q jt
Q jt
µ jt( 1η jt +
1
ν −1)
= 1 − (
µ jt
ν −1)
µ jt( 1η jt +
1
ν −1)
= 0 implies µ jt =
η jt
η jt−1 .
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process innovations. Both the state of the market and innovations can shift the demand and/or affect
its elasticity with respect to price. Let’s write
Q jt = Q(P∗jt, PIt,D jt, z jt, d jt),
where PIt is the industry price and D jt is the state of the market.
Capital K jt is a state variable (whose dynamic choice we leave implicit for simplicity) and the
prices of the inputs are the industry wide prices WIt = {Wt, PMt} subject to a vector of firm level
disturbances ζ jt. Cost can hence be written as
C(K jt,WIt, ζ jt,Q jt/ exp(ω jt)),
where WIt represent industry input prices and ζ jt the idiosyncratic shocks in the input prices.
Adjustment costs in markup consist of costs that vary with markup in the previous period
µ jt−1, the state of the market D jt, and the introduction of process and product innovations z jt−1 and
d jt−1. The introduction of a process innovation is likely to reduce cost and thus enlarge the margin,
lessening the markup adjustment costs. The introduction of a new product may facilitate or hinder
the change of the markup, perhaps depending on consumers’ reception of the price change. Let’s
write the adjustment costs as
A(µ jt, µ jt−1,D jt, z jt, d jt).
Replacing ω jt as before by the law of motion g(ω jt−1, z jt, d jt) + ξ jt it is easy to see that static profits
can then be written as
pi jt = pi(µ jt,K jt, PIt,WIt, ζ jt,D jt, z jt, d jt, ω jt−1, ξ jt).
Collecting the state variables in the vector S jt = (µ jt−1,K jt, PIt,WIt, ζ jt,D jt, z jt, d jt, ω jt−1, ξ jt)
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the Bellman equation for the dynamic problem is
V(S jt) = max
µ jt
[pi(µ jt,K jt, PIt,WIt, ζ jt,D jt, z jt, d jt, ω jt−1, ξ jt) − A(µ jt, µ jt−1,D jt, z jt, d jt)]
+βEt[V(S jt+1)|S jt, µ jt],
which gives rise to a policy function for the markup that has the form
µ jt = h˜t(µ jt−1,K jt,D jt, z jt, d jt, ω jt−1) + ε˜ jt,
where we have collapsed the industry prices in the time subindex and collected together the errors
in the disturbance ε˜ jt.
The latest equation gives us the reduced form for the markup that corresponds to the setting of
the price as a dynamic problem. Past markup shows up here because the adjustment costs make it
a state variable. The firm chooses when and by how much to change the markup according to the
state of the market and the introduction of innovations. Notice that the capital of the firm, which
affects the current costs, and the impact of the evolution of future industry output and input prices
(represented by the time dependence) as well as lagged productivity are also part of the equation.
Recall from equation (5) that r jt−1 − c jt−1 + ln ν = ln µ jt−1 + e jt−1. Integrating the expectation
function over the lagged unobservable e jt−1, and replacingω jt−1 by f (Z jt−1) the system of equations
becomes:23
r jt − c jt = − ln ν + ht(r jt−1 − c jt−1 + ln ν,K jt,D jt, z jt, d jt, f (Z jt−1)) + ε jt + e jt
p jt = ht(r jt−1 − c jt−1 + ln ν,K jt,D jt, z jt, d jt, f (Z jt−1)) (7)
+ mc(X jt) − g( f (Z jt−1), z jt, d jt) − ξ jt + ε jt + e jt.
The systems of equations (6) and (7) only differ in the h(·) function that we are using to estimate
the conditional expectation of the margin. In the first case we are estimating the current elasticity
23We slightly abuse the notation by writing the function ht(·) and the error ε jt using the same symbols as those in
equation (6).
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of demand, in the second case the elasticity of demand is not the relevant pricing rule although we
will be getting implicitly an "equivalent" elasticity derived from the firm choice.
Here the first equation of the system doesn’t introduce any particular problem, because all
variables are by assumption uncorrelated with the composite error ε jt + e jt. The presence of the
unobservable ω jt−1, replaced by f (Z jt−1), implies the same restrictions on usable instruments that
we have previously discussed in detail. As the function ht(·) shows up in the second equation we
well have to add any extra instrument used in the first equation to the set used in the second.
The marginal cost relevant for the firm may additionally include the adjustment costs of labor.
These costs are only partially included in the observed average cost (the part that has an accounting
counterpart, as the overtime done by the workers). A dynamic model where the costs of adjusting
labor are explicitly considered gives rise to expressions for these adjustment costs based on observ-
ables (Doraszelski and Jaumandreu, 2013, 2015, see). Here we develop a correction for the average
cost when there are labor adjustment costs that is based on the ratio of materials bill to wage bill
(see Appendix C). Assuming that one part of the relevant costs is already included in the observed
variable costs we have MC jt =
AC∗jt
ν (1 + sL jt∆ jt)
1−θ(1 + sL jt∆ jt)θ =
AC jt
ν (1 + sL jt∆ jt)
θ, where AC∗jt
are latent average costs and AC jt observed average costs. According to this correction, the ratio of
revenue over variable costs should be written as
r jt − c jt = θ ln(1 + sL jt∆ jt) − ln ν + ln µ jt + e jt,
where sL jt is the share of labor in variable costs and ∆ jt is the the gap between the wage and the
shadow price of labor under adjustment costs. When applying this correction, everything is as
our variable r jt − c jt becomes r jt − c jt − θ ln(1 + wL jt∆ jt), where θ is a parameter to be estimated.
We estimate the system with and without the adjustment cost correction, and the results favor the
specification with adjustment costs.
In what follows, we detail the estimation of the static and dynamic pricing model under a
particular parametric specification for the production function. This specification makes the model
particularly simple and the identification straightforward.
63
2.3 Estimation
To take equations in (6) and (7) to the data, three components remain to be specified: the observable
component of marginal cost, the Markov process that governs the endogenous productivity process
and the markup.
Let us start by the marginal cost function. We consider for simplicity the Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function
q jt = β0 + βkk jt + βll jt + βmm jt + ω jt,
so the short-run marginal cost function in terms of materials is
mc jt = κ − βkk jt + (1 − βl − βm)m jt + (1 − βl)pM jt + βlw jt − ω jt, (8)
where κ = −β0 − ln(βl + βm) − βl ln βl + βl ln βm.
With regards to the productivity process we are going to use the inhomogeneous Markov pro-
cessω jt = βt+g(ω jt−1, z jt, d jt)+ξ jt.Our preferred alternative is using the lagged inverted production
function to substitute for ω jt−1. Let us use f jt−1 as a shorthand for q jt−1 − βkk jt−1 − βll jt − βmm jt−1.
Specifyng g(·) as a complete polynomial of order three in its arguments we have:24
ω jt = βt + g( f jt−1, z jt, d jt) + ξ jt = βt + γ1 f jt−1 + γ2 f 2jt−1 + γ3 f
3
jt−1 + γ4z jt + γ5d jt
+ γ6 f jt−1 · z jt + γ7 f 2jt−1 · z jt
+ γ8 f jt−1 · d jt + γ9 f 2jt−1 · d jt
+ γ10 f jt−1 · z jt · d jt + γ11 f 2jt−1 · z jt · d jt + ξ jt. (9)
It remains to specify the function h(·). In the static case we use
h(·) = ln η jt
η jt − 1 = ln
1 + exp(y jtλ)
exp(y jtλ)
= ln(1 + exp(y jtλ)) − y jtλ, (10)
24We implicitly collapse the constant of the unknown function in the constant of the equation.
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where y jt = {md jt, d jt, z jt}. The function restricts elasticity to be greater than one while allows
for its cyclical fluctuation according to the firm-level state of the market indicator md jt or market
dynamism.
In the dynamic case we specify the law of motion for markup as a function of a polynomial in
the the lagged markup, capital, the firm-level state of the market indicator md jt or market dynamism,
product and process innovations, and lagged productivity replaced by f jt−1:25
ht(·) = β′t + λ1(r jt−1 − c jt−1) + λ2(r jt−1 − c jt−1)2 + λ3(r jt−1 − c jt−1)3
+ λ4k jt + λ5md jt + λ6z jt + λ7d jt + λ8 f jt−1. (10′)
Lastly, recall that the relevant markup (r jt − c jt) may change depending on whether we additionally
consider there are adjustment costs in labor or not
In the estimations that we present below we plug expressions (8), (9) and (10) into (6) for the
case of static pricing, and expressions (8), (9) and (10′) into (7) for the case of dynamic pricing to
estimate each system of equations by two-step nonlinear GMM. Write the residuals ν1 jt = ε jt + e jt
and ν2 jt = −ξ jt+ε jt+e jt as a function of the variables x jt and the vector θ of parameters to estimate.
Stacked for each firm j, the GMM problem is
min
θ

1
N jA1(z j)ν1 j(x j, θ, )
1
N jA2(z j)ν2 j(x j, θ)

′
Ŵ

1
N jA1(z j)ν1 j(x j, θ)
1
N jA2(z j)ν2 j(x j, θ)

where A1(·) is an L1 × T j and A2(·) an L2 × T j matrix of functions of exogenous variables z j (a
vector partially overlapped with x j); ν1 j(·) and ν2 j(·) are the T j×1 vectors of residuals, and N is the
number of firms. L = L1 + L2 denotes the total number of moments that we use and T j the number
of observations for firm j. For the first step we use the consistent weighting matrix
25This particular specification legitimates to get rid of the constant ln ν.
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Ŵ =
 (
1
N jA1(z j)A1(z j)
′)−1 0
0 ( 1N jA2(z j)A2(z j)
′)−1
 ,
and for the second the optimal weighting matrix. Lastly, notice that the subscript on A(·) implies
that we use different set of instruments for each of the two equations in the system. We have
estimated the equations under the dynamic pricing model and will now talk about the instruments
we used.
There are two equations in the system specified in (7). The set of exogenous variables for
the first equation includes: constant, time dummies (15), a polynomial of order three in lagged
markup, capacity utilization rate and a polynomial of order three in its lag, current and lagged
prices of capital, lagged variable input prices (price of materials and wage), lagged inputs (capital,
labor and materials) and the two dummies of lagged innovation.
The set of exogenous variables for the second equation includes those used for the first equation
and the following: a polynomial of order three in lagged inputs (capital, labor and materials), the
interaction of the two innovation dummies as well as their product with each one of the lagged
inputs.
Contemporaneous capital is a legitimate instrument. However, we avoid it because of potential
measurement error. For the same reason we have also omitted some of the polynomial terms in
lagged inputs and lagged markup for some industries. In the end, for the system of equations we
end up with a minimum of 70 instruments that expands to an upwards of 75 for certain industries.
We have to estimate 4 parameters that enter nonlinearly: βk, βl, βm, the parameters of the
marginal cost/production functions, and θ, the parameter on the labor adjustment cost in the model-
ing of the markups. We have 50 or 51 other parameters that enter linearly (7 or 8 coefficients from
the law of motion for markup,26 32 coefficients from the two sets of constant and time dummies
that correspond to each equation, and 11 polynomial coefficients in the productivity process), for
whose estimation we apply the procedure of “concentrating out.” This gives us a minimum of 16
over-identifying restrictions that allow to test for the specification.
26For some industries we have excluded capital in the markup specification.
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2.4 Data
We estimate the model with data on ten (unbalanced panel) industry samples, which in total amount
to more than 2,300 manufacturing firms and 17,000 observations, corresponding to the period
1990-2006. All variables come from the survey ESEE (Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales),
a firm-level panel survey of Spanish manufacturing starting in 1990. At the beginning of this
survey, firms with fewer than 200 workers were sampled randomly by industry and size strata,
retaining 5%, while firms with more than 200 workers were all requested to participate, and the
positive answers represented more or less a self-selected 70%. To preserve representation, samples
of newly created firms were added to the initial sample every subsequent year. At the same time,
there are exits from the sample, coming from both death and attrition.
The survey then provides a random sample of Spanish manufacturing with the largest firms
oversampled. Information on the firms include, in addition to the usual output and input quantity
measures, the firm-level variations for the price of the output and the price of the inputs, the in-
troduction of technological (process and product) innovations, and the indicator of the state of the
market market dynamism.27
Tables 1 and 2 report the size of the samples and some descriptive statistics. Table 1 focuses
on prices. The evolution of prices over the whole period is moderate, but heterogeneous enough
to motivate the exploration of the role of innovation in their evolution. An OLS regression of the
growth of prices on the dummies of process and product innovation, controlling by time dummies,
turns out to be hardly informative: almost no effect is statistically significant. Table 2 focuses on
innovation. The introduction of process and product innovations is more heterogeneous. Firms tend
to introduce more process than product innovations, at the approximate paces of one innovation
every three and four years respectively. Innovation is, as expected, especially important in the
more technology intensive sectors 3, 4, 5 and 6.
27Firms are asked to assess the current and future situation (contraction, stability, or expansion) of up to 5 separate
markets in which they operate. The index of market dynamism is computed as a weighted average of the responses and
proxies for the demand shifter.
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2.5 Estimation Results
We have carried out the estimation of the system of equations (7), i.e. under dynamic pricing, with
very sensible results that allow us to examine the impacts of innovation on prices. In the near future,
we would like to also compare results with those under static pricing to evaluate which model is a
better fit for the data. For the rest of this section, we first present these estimates (Table 3) and then
derive the implications for the productivity growth and price variations via also markup due to the
impact of innovation (Table 4).
The results of the preliminary estimates are summarized in Table 3. Columns (1)-(4) report the
key parameters from the markup equation, Columns (5)-(7) contain the results for the parameters
in the marginal cost/production function, and the last two columns present over-identifying test
statistics and p-values. As noted in Table 3, to reach these results we use instead contemporaneous
innovations in three industries (3, 8 and 9). In all but four industries (1, 2, 5 and 6) we are not able
to include capital in the margin without worsening the results. Overall, the specification test passed
in 8/10 industries.
The reported coefficients from the markup equation are those of market dynamism, innovation
and adjustment cost. These results suggest the state of the market has a significant positive effect
on the markup in six industries. Markup also increases in process innovation in seven industries.
The impact of product innovation, however, is non-significant in all of them. Lastly, the labor
adjustment cost parameter in column (4) is positive and of a reasonable size in all industries but
one.
The parameters in the marginal cost/production functions in Columns (5) to (7) are in general
good (although a few sectors show insignificant capital elasticities). Returns to scale are very close
to constant in all industries but one.
The last part of our analysis is to comprehensively summarize the relationship among innova-
tion, markup and prices using the estimates. Recall that innovation affects productivity and thus
marginal costs. Furthermore, there exists adjustment costs in the markup under dynamic pricing,
there exists adjustment costs in the markup, therefore cost changes induced by innovation may not
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be perfectly passed onto prices. To assess these two separate components, we first estimate the dis-
tribution of productivity ω jt and summarize them by industry and innovation category in Columns
(1)-(4) of Table 4. We then combine these productivity changes with changes in the markup due
to innovation to summarize the findings on final predicted price changes in Columns (5)-(8) of the
same Table.
To first get at the relationship between innovation and productivity, we first compute the indi-
vidual values of productivity growth rates, given by ∆ω jt = ω jt −ω jt−1. Then we split the industry
samples into observations corresponding to the introduction of a process innovation only, prod-
uct innovation only, both kind of innovations and, finally, observations corresponding to moments
without any kind of innovation. Finally, we calculate weighted averages of the rates of growth, us-
ing firms sales shares lagged two periods as weights and replicating the observations for the small
firms (less than 200 workers) as indicated by the known starting representativeness in the survey of
each kind of firm.28
The corresponding results that capture the relationship between innovation and productivity are
reported in Columns (1) to (4) of Table 4. They show that process innovation is associated with the
most productivity increase as expected. However, as discussed before we do not expect a particular
relationship between the increases in productivity when there is no innovation and when there is
product innovation. This remains largely an empirical question. We find that for these Spanish
manufacturing firms, absent any innovation there exist exogenous improvements in productivity
in 7 industries. When there is only product innovation productivity increases are less intense in
four industries and there is even a productivity decrease in two industries. It is then perhaps not
surprising that for firms that have both process and product innovation, productivity increases are
large in some industries, neutralized to near zero in some others and negative in the rest.
To arrive at the final predicted price changes, we need to also take into account the behavior
of the markup and the results are summarized in Columns (5)-(8) of Table 4. They show that ab-
sent innovation, prices decrease by a more modest amount of 0.6 percentage point a year across
industries on average. The introduction of process innovations changes this price decrease to 1.9
28Since the proportions were approximately 5% and 70% this implies replicating the smallest firms 14 times.
69
percentage points a year, which is quite remarkable if we take into account that firms take advan-
tage of process innovations to enlarge the markup of 1.2 percentage points. Product innovation
sometimes decreases price, and other times increases it, giving an average of almost zero change.
Lastly, product innovations implemented together with process innovations tend to raise prices by
an average of 0.4 percentage points.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper examines the impact of process and product innovations on prices set by firms. This
impact is modeled to be the result of two related processes: 1) the way in which innovation affects
productivity and hence marginal cost and 2) the extent to which firms pass changes in costs onto
prices via markup when there are adjustment costs. From this dynamic pricing problem with ad-
justment costs in markup, we derive a set of equations that is then estimated with yearly prices and
innovations reported by an unbalanced panel of Spanish manufacturing firms.
Our estimation results show that markup is highly persistent and mostly pro-cyclical. Process
innovations increase productivity and thus decrease marginal costs as expected. However, since
cost reductions are only imperfectly passed through to prices, firms are also able to take advantage
of process innovations by increasing their markups. In contrast, the effect of product innovations
on prices is ambiguous; after the launch of improved or new products, markups are not signifi-
cantly affected and productivity could either increase or decrease. The overall findings in the paper
contribute to the scarce literature on innovation and firm-level prices.
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2.7 Appendix
Appendix A
Variable cost minimization implies the cost function
C jt = C(K jt,W jt, PM jt,Q jt/ exp(ω jt)),
where W jt and PM jt stand for the prices of the variable inputs L jt and M jt respectively. Marginal
cost is
MC jt =
∂C jt
∂Q jt
=
∂C
∂(Q jt/ exp(ω jt))
(K jt,W jt, PM jt,Q jt/ exp(ω jt)) exp(−ω jt).
On the other hand, by Shephard’s lemma, optimal materials choice conditional on output is
M jt =
∂C jt
∂PM jt
= CPM (K jt,W jt, PM jt,Q jt/ exp(ω jt)).
Inverting the latest equation for Q jt/ exp(ω jt), and using the resulting expression to replace
Q jt/ exp(ω jt) in marginal cost, we get
MC jt = MC(K jt,M jt,W jt, PM jt) exp(−ω jt) = MC(X jt) exp(−ω jt),
where X jt = {K jt,M jt,W jt, PM jt} is a vector of observable variables. Variable M jt could be alter-
natively replaced by L jt. In practice we prefer to keep the specification with M jt because materials
are less likely to be subject to adjustment costs.
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Appendix B
The choice of which expression to use is not trivial. The inclusion of the disturbance e jt implies
that we only know the price decided by the firm up to this error: P jt = P∗jt exp(e jt). As in the
structural estimation of production functions, a natural choice for the expression to be used would
be an inverted input demand relationship. For example, profit maximization implies the demand
for materials
M jt = M(K jt,W jt/P∗jt(1 −
1
η jt
), PM jt/P∗jt(1 −
1
η jt
), ω jt).
But, as this equation makes clear, demands for labor and materials include the output price that
when specified in terms of observed price will include the error e jt. Having a variable measured
with error in the expression to use in the g(·) function, even if it is uncorrelated with everything, is
a drawback for the identification of the model.29
If we assume that we observe Q jt, however, we have more than one solution.30 A first possibil-
ity is inverting the (lagged) conditional demand for materials (see Appendix A), that is
ω jt−1 = ln Q jt−1 − lnC−1PM (K jt−1,M jt−1,W jt−1, PM jt−1).
Another possibility is directly inverting the production function
ω jt−1 = ln Q jt−1 − ln F(K jt−1, L jt−1,M jt−1).
29Scholars estimating production functions tend to avoid this complication by assuming that all prices are the same
for all firms and can be replaced by dummies. In this case prices disappear from the demand for materials, that can be
written M jt = Mt(K jt, ω jt). See, for example, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003b) or Loecker (2011).
30Quantity is obtained by dividing revenue by the observed price. If revenue and price are affected by the same e error
this ratio gives the correct quantity.
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Appendix C
Write the Bellman equation using the explicit profits in terms of labor and materials and adding the
cost of adjusting employment AL(L jt, L jt−1)
V(S jt, L jt−1) = max
µ jt
[
(µ jt
v
− 1
)
(W jtL jt + PM jtM jt) − A(µ jt, µ jt−1,D jt, z jt, d jt) − AL(L jt, L jt−1)]
+βEt[V(S jt+1)|S jt, L jt].
The first order condition for labor can be written as
(
1
ν
∂µ jt
∂Q jt
(W jtL jt + PM jtM jt jt) − ∂A jt
∂µ jt
∂µ jt
∂Q jt
− βEt[∂A jt+1
∂µ jt
|S jt, L jt] ∂µ jt
∂Q jt
)
∂Q jt
∂L jt
+
(µ jt
v
− 1
)
W jt − ∂AL jt
∂L jt
− βEt[∂AL jt+1
∂L jt
|S jt, L jt] = 0,
where we use the shorthands A jt, A jt+1, AL jt and AL jt+1 for the values of the adjustment cost func-
tions. From the first order condition for output it is easy to check that the first parenthesis can be
replaced by −
(
µ jt
v − 1
)
MC jt so that we obtain
MC jt
∂Q jt
∂L jt
= W jt
1 − 1W jt (µ jtv − 1)
∂AL jt
∂L jt
− 1
W jt
(
µ jt
v − 1
)βEt[∂AL jt+1
∂L jt
|S jt, L jt]

= W jt(1 + ∆ jt),
where ∆ jt represents the gap between the wage and the shadow price of labor under adjustment
costs.
We can similarly obtain the following first order condition for materials:
MC jt
∂Q jt
∂M jt
= PM jt.
Adding the two first order conditions we can see that, under adjustment costs of labor, the relation-
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ship between marginal and average variable cost becomes
νMC jt =
W jtL jt + PM jtM jt jt
Q jt
(1 + sL jt∆ jt)
= AVC jt(1 + sL jt∆ jt),
where sL jt is the share of the wage bill in variable costs.
To estimate ∆ jt we use the fact that with the Cobb-Douglas specification of the production
function the ratio of first order conditions gives
PM jtM jt
W jtL jt
=
βM
βL
(1 + ∆ jt).
We assume that, for each firm, the average of the gaps tends to cancel over time and that
(̂
βM
βL
)
= 1T j j
PM jtM jt
W jtL jt
. We then estimate ∆ jt as
∆̂ jt =
PM jtM jt
W jtL jt(̂
βM
βL
) − 1,
and ln(1 + sL jt∆̂ jt) is constructed using the observed cost shares.
Chapter 3
Do Firm Level Shocks Generate Aggregate Fluctuations?
(with Maria Francisca Perez Veyl)
3.1 Introduction
Business cycle fluctuations are often thought to have caused by aggregate shocks, since uncorre-
lated sector or firm level shocks average out in the aggregate due to the law of large numbers.
However, a number of recent studies show the diversification of idiosyncratic shocks breaks down
when sectoral linkages or firm size distributions are highly skewed. These studies provide the in-
sight that in an economy where few sectors serve as major input suppliers or few firms account for
a disproportionate share of production, shocks to these sectors or firms can propagate to generate
aggregate fluctuations.
While the sector based story has a long theoretical tradition accompanied by empirical evi-
dence,1 the relevance of firm level shocks to aggregate fluctuations remains to be acknowledged
and quantified. Gabaix (2011) was the first study to formally show that in an economy with fat-
tailed size distribution of firms, idiosyncratic shocks to firms diversify at a milder rate that leads
1Sector-based stories date back to the seminal work of Long and Plosser (1983) where they show input-output
linkages can propagate independent production shocks in each sector over time and across sectors with a six-sector
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. This study was later challenged by Dupor (1999) because if the number
of sectors is large enough, positive shocks in one sector can still be neutralized by negative shocks in others. Though
around the same time Horvath (1998, 2000) argue the cancellation of sector-specific shocks is affected by the existence of
factor demand linkages; whether shocks diversify depends on not the number of sectors but whether there are a handful
of them that are important inputs in the production processes of many others. Two recent studies, Carvalho (2008);
Acemoglu et al. (2012), build on Horvath’s insight and show that if there are only few input supplier sectors then the
convergence of aggregate volatility to zero slows down considerably. A productivity shock in one major sector has a
“cascading” effect in the economy and as a result affects not only the direct downstream sectors but also the series of
them that are interconnected with each other. In all aforementioned studies, the authors provide also empirical exercises
that support their theoretical models.
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to nontrivial effects on aggregate fluctuations. Further, output volatility originated from micro-
shocks is an increasing function of the Herfindahl index of firms’ sales shares, or in other words,
of how concentrated the economy is.2 The theoretical framework is then accompanied by an em-
pirical analysis where the author shows shocks to largest firms in the US statistically explains GDP
growth over the period 1952-2008.
In light of Gabaix’s theory, countries that are more concentrated than the US should observe
stronger effects of firm level shocks on aggregate fluctuations. However, since the theory is rel-
atively new and comprehensive panel data are not readily available for many countries, studies
investigating the effects of idiosyncratic shocks outside the US are scarce.
This paper contributes to the existing literature by examining the relevance of idiosyncratic
shocks to output fluctuations for three OECD countries (Germany, Canada and the UK) in addition
to the US. Figure 3.1a presents the relative size of the top 100 firms in terms of their sales to GDP
ratio in these four economies, and Figure 3.1b the Herfindahl index of firms’ sales share among the
largest 100 firms. Comparing with the US, the top 100 firms in other countries not only account for
a larger share of their corresponding GDP, they are also much more concentrated. These descriptive
statistics suggest large firms in these countries could be an important source of variability, and the
effects of idiosyncratic shocks on the aggregate should be stronger as a result.
To assess the empirical relevance of idiosyncratic shocks for output fluctuations in these coun-
tries, we regress the growth of GDP per capita on the “granular residual” and its different lags. The
granular residual, proposed by Gabaix (2011), is a transparent statistic that summarizes the impor-
tance of firm idiosyncratic shocks using the weighted sum of firm level shocks, where the weights
are calculated as the firms’ sales to GDP ratio to reflect their relative importance. This empirical
strategy allows us to work with a broader sample of countries as we would not require input-output
matrices to measure the importance of firm level productivity shocks for the economy, only annual
firms’ sales and employment, and countries’ GDP per capita are necessary.3
2The results in Gabaix (2011) only require economies with sufficiently large herfindahls. The central case of firms’
size being Zipf-distributed is justified because of its tractability and clean exposition. Also, this distribution generates
very high herfindahls.
3Despite using an empirical strategy that is lenient on data requirements, we still face some data limitations along
the time-series dimension. In the end, we are able to construct the granular residual using the top 100 firms for at least
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Figure 3.1: Relative Size and Degree of Concentration of Top 100 Firms by Country
Our results show that idiosyncratic shocks to large firms are of little relevance in the UK or
Canada but explain roughly 1/3 of the output fluctuations in the US and Germany. Further investi-
gation indicates the top ranking firms are indeed the most important contributors to granular effects,
but because diversification is at work still in the UK and Canada these firms are not able to explain
GDP growth. Our study suggests that while firm size distribution is found to be highly skewed in
many economies,4 the ability of the largest firms to transmit shocks may not be universal and thus
should not be taken for granted.
The studies closest to ours are di Giovanni et al. (2014) and Foerster et al. (2011); they both
investigate the importance of firm level shocks but focus on one country each and differ in method-
ology. While the first finds support for the hypothesis that microeconomic shocks drive aggregate
fluctuations, like ours the second paper casts doubts on the validity of this hypothesis. Using de-
tailed French firm level data, di Giovanni et al. (2014) find firm-specific shocks to be almost twice
as important as the combined effect of sectoral and macroeconomics shocks in driving aggregate
sales growth. Further, they find that most of the effect is not coming directly from shocks to indi-
vidual firms, but input-output linkages proxied by firm-to-firm covariance. Foerster et al. (2011)
uses factor methods to decompose US industrial production and explore the plausibility of the
20 years for all of our countries.
4di Giovanni and Levchenko (2013) find in a set of 43 countries, firm size distributions are highly skewed and on
average close to Zipf.
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granular- and network-origins hypotheses of aggregate fluctuations. They find no support for the
granular hypothesis, and aggregate volatility is better explained by co-variability among sectors.
Furthermore, co-variability is explained by common factors, very little of which is the result of the
transmission via input-output linkages.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the empirical specification
used to estimate the importance of firm level idiosyncratic shocks. In Section 3.3 we present the re-
gression results for the countries in our sample, and in Section 3.4 we deconstruct the differences in
the findings for the US and Germany versus those for the UK and Canada. Finally our conclusions
are summarized in Section 3.5.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
In this section, we first summarize the theoretical framework from which the granular residual is
derived and how to construct it. We then specify the empirical strategy and describe the data.
3.2.1 Granular Residual
In an economy with input-output linkages and endogenous input response, aggregate productivity
growth is a weighted sum of firms’ Hicks-neutral productivity growth, gzi :
gTFP =
∑
i
sales of firm i
GDP
gzi , (3.1)
where the weights
∑
i
sales of firm i
GDP capture the propagation effect from firm level shocks to the rest
of the economy. Domar (1961) and Hulten (1978) show that these are the appropriate weights to
measure the total effect of firm level productivity changes on aggregate productivity. The intuition
is that an increase in productivity in firm i will increase output of other firms that use firm i’s good
as an intermediate input, which in turn increases output again, and so on.
Without disturbances, growth in GDP is proportional to the growth in TFP:
gGDP = µ gTFP, (3.2)
82
where µ ≥ 1 is the factor usage intensity that is a combination of the elasticity of substitution of
labor and output elasticities with respect to production inputs.5
Combining (3.1) and (3.2), the impact of idiosyncratic shocks on aggregate output is captured
by the following relationship:
gGDP = µ
∑
i
sales of firm i
GDP
gzi , (3.3)
where Γ∗ =
∑
i
sales of firm i
GDP gzi is Gabaix’s “granular residual.” Equation (3.3) provides the basis
for the regression framework to test the granular hypothesis: granular effects are said to be present
when the weighted sum of idiosyncratic shocks to large firms statistically explains GDP fluctuations
as measured by growth in GDP per capita.
The only detailed calculation of this empirical strategy is the construction of firm level shocks.
To avoid data availability issues, we also estimate firm level productivity using labor productivity
of firm i:6
zi = ln
sales of firm i in year t
number of employees in firm i in year t
. (3.4)
To compute the shocks to firms’ productivity growth, we model firms’ labor productivity
growth, g, as depending on a set of firm’s characteristics, Xi jt, and an idiosyncratic shock, εi jt:
gi jt = β′Xi jt + εi jt. (3.5)
For simplicity, we use year and industry dummies to proxy for firm’s characteristics:
git = c + dt + εit (3.6)
gi jt = c + dt + IND jt + εi jt, (3.7)
5Consider an economy with the production technology Y = AtLαt and consumer preference Ut(Ct, Lt) = log(Ct −
L1+1/φt
1+1/φ ). With competitive markets for output and labor, the equilibrium is characterized by Nt = (αAt)
1
1+1/φ−α and Yt =
αA
1+1/φ
1+1/φ−α
t . In this economy, output growth is proportional to TFP growth Yˆ = µAˆ, where µ =
1+1/φ
1+1/φ−α is the factor usage.
6We implement the Olley and Pakes (1996) method to estimate the firm level Solow residual and contrast it with
our measure of labor productivity. We find that the two methods yield similar and highly correlated estimates for the
productivity growth in the US, the average correlation coefficient is 0.95.
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and calculate firm level shocks as the demeaned labor productivity growth rates, where the mean is
computed over all firms of the year (the case when we use only year dummies), or of the year and
industry (when both year and industry dummies are used in the regressions).7
Using both estimations for the idiosyncratic shocks, we construct two versions of the “granular
residual”:
Γt,v1 =
K=100∑
i=1
S i,t−1
Yt−1
εˆit; Γt,v2 =
K=100∑
i=1
S i,t−1
Yt−1
εˆi jt. (3.8)
Since we are interested in the effect of the largest firm we only work with the largest top
K = 100 firms ranked by their sales to output ratio in the previous period.8
3.2.2 Econometric Specification
To test for the effect of firm level idiosyncratic shocks on aggregate fluctuations we regress our
measure of idiosyncratic shocks, Γ, on growth of GDP per capita using the following specification:
gYt = α +
2∑
i=0
µiΓt−i + ut. (3.9)
The adjusted R-squared from regressing GDP growth gYt on Γt and its different lags allows
one to assess the extent to which idiosyncratic shocks explain the variability of GDP growth. If
we recall equation (3.3), the coefficient on the granular residual will provide an estimation of the
factor usage in these different countries.9
7The challenge with correctly identifying εit remains apparent. It is hard to identify εit in the data because aggre-
gate shocks could cause firm i’s volatility or reflect it. We do not directly address the reflection problem but perform
robustness checks to also control for the common factors so to prove the explanatory power of the granular residual is
not coming from aggregate shocks (e.g. oil, monetary, fiscal policy shocks and etc). The reflection problem is studied
in (Manski, 2007). It is similar to “the problem of interpreting the almost simultaneous movements of a person and his
reflection in a mirror.” Manski points out unless one knows about optics and human behavior, he would not be able to
tell whether the mirror image cause the person’s movements or reflect them. We attempted to apply the few solution
methods that have been proposed in the literature but to no avail. The reason is these solutions all involve exogenous
variation that is hard to find in our context.
8To verify the empirical methodology we simulated a simple economy, with exogenous production and without
linkages. With the true idiosyncratic shocks, we constructed the granular residual and regressed output on this measure.
The empirical strategy tends to bias the granular residual downwards in its magnitude and volatility, decreasing its
explanatory power. Further, it seems to capture well the idiosyncratic components of a firm’s productivity growth in a
granular world without inducing any spurious bias. Interestingly, the results also show that the explanatory power of the
model decreases when the idiosyncratic shocks to large firms are less volatile.
9Gabaix (2011) takes µ = 2.6 as the benchmark to compare the regression coefficient with for the US.
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Table 3.1 provides a summary of country characteristics in terms of the variables used in the
regression model. The average and the volatility of per capita GDP growth across the countries
are very similar (columns 1 and 2), but firm level productivity growth is much more volatile in
non-US countries (column 4). Column 5 shows the correlation between growth rates across firms
is small for all of the countries, suggesting the measure we use for firm level shock does capture
idiosyncratic variation to the firms. Finally, the average and standard deviation of the granular
residual are smaller for version 2 than for 1 (columns 6 and 7 for version 1 and 8 and 9 for version
2). This shows when we demean by year-industry, we further get rid of industry-specific shocks
that could confound our results.
Table 3.1: Country Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
µgY σgY µg σg ρgi,g j µΓv1 σΓv1 µΓv2 σΓv2
US 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.110 0.023 0.0003 0.0037 0.0003 0.0032
Canada 0.017 0.021 0.017 0.208 0.016 0.0006 0.0055 -0.0001 0.0044
Germany 0.019 0.019 0.015 0.179 0.020 0.0034 0.0092 -0.0001 0.0072
UK 0.019 0.022 0.011 0.258 0.010 0.0031 0.0144 -0.0016 0.0081
µgY is the average annual per capita GDP growth; σgY is the standard deviation of annual per capita GDP
growth; µg is the average annual firm-level productivity growth; σg is the standard deviation of annual firm-level
productivity growth; ρgi ,g j is the average annual sample correlation of firm evel productivity growth; µΓ is
l the average annual granular residual with year-demeaning; σΓ is the standard deviation of the annual granular
residual; µΓsic2 is the standard deviation of the annual granular residual with industry demeaning;
σΓsic2 is the standard deviation of annual granular residual with industry demeaning.
3.2.3 Data
Firm level data for the US and Canada, UK and Germany are from Compustat North America,
Computstat Global, respectively. The length of coverage varies and it spans from 1950 to present
and from 1987 to present for NA and international companies. We keep only firms incorporated
and headquartered in their home country so to exclude foreign firms to the best of our ability. The
oil industry is excluded due to difficulty in teasing out real firm level shocks from the aggregate
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commodity price shocks.10 Figure 3.4 summarizes the number of firms, with valid data required
by our regression specification, by country and year for each country.
The advantage of using Compustat is the comparability of information reported across coun-
tries, but the coverage on the number of firms is limited in Germany and Canada for some of the
years. Further, since the analysis is done over the top 100 firms in the economy we lose additional
observations because for some years there are less than 100 firms. However, since sales of the top
50 and 100 firms as a percentage of GDP track each other closely for Germany and Canada, we
restrict our samples to years with at least 50 rather than 100 firms. This means for years less than
100 (but more than 50) firms we use all firms in our empirical exercises.
Macroeconomic data (GDP, GDP per capita and GDP deflators) are taken from the World
Bank’s Development Indicators database. GDP deflators are used to convert sales into real terms.11
Some of the sales figures in Compustat are denominated in non-local currencies, and we look to
the respective country’s central bank website to obtain the exchange rates.12
3.3 Estimation Results
In this section, we present the estimation results for the US and Canada, UK and Germany as
specified in regression (3.9) for different lags for the granular residual.
3.3.1 Impact of Idiosyncratic Firm Level Shocks
Table 3.2 presents the regression results for the US, Germany, the UK and Canada. Taking the US
as the benchmark, we see in columns (1) & (2) of Panel A that the granular residual explains 24%
(35%) of the fluctuations in GDP growth using 1 (2) lag(s) when demeaning by year. When we
control for the contemporaneous granular residual and its two lags, their coefficients are significant
and hovering around 2.6—the theoretical value of µ Gabaix (2011) uses for comparison. The
10We also exclude financial firms as in Gabaix (2011), “because the nature of their sales are not in line with the
meaning of ‘gross output’ in the paper.”
11Ideally one would like to use industry production indexes but they are not readily available so we use GDP deflators
instead.
12This could introduce potential measurement errors since the exchange rates were matched to the fiscal years, rather
than the period covered by a firm’s financial statements.
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presence of granular effects is confirmed in these results.
When we control for industry-year specific shocks by demeaning at the 2-digit industry level,
we observe an increase in the granular effects for the US in Panel B columns (1) & (2) of the
same table. The resulting firm idiosyncratic shocks are closer to the true εit when industry specific
shocks are controlled for, hence if the granular hypothesis holds we should expect to explain more
of GDP fluctuations.13
The results for the other countries are mixed. For Germany, we find the GR to explain GDP
fluctuations even better than for the US (35% (36%) when demeaning by year, and 24% (34%)
when demeaning by year-industry). However, regardless of demeaning the GR by year or indus-
try, we do not find granular effects in Canada or the UK. The adjusted R2 is essentially zero and
the coefficients are insignificant and often negative. Even though all countries meet the sufficient
conditions, we find idiosyncratic shocks translate to aggregate fluctuations only in the US and
Germany.
The natural progression at this point is to implement factor methods to examine whether any
residual common shocks give rise to our findings, and to use principal component analysis to
investigate which firms explain the aggregate fluctuations the most. However, since the identities
of the largest firms change from year to year, we cannot use conventional methods to examine
whether our findings are driven by common factors or specific firms. Thus in the next section
we deconstruct our findings utilizing still the granular residual measure demeaned at the industry
level, since this level of demeaning yields the most robust proxy for idiosyncratic shock as shown
in Table 3.1.
13We also experimented with demeaning at the 3-digit and 4-digit level but the granular effects are weakened as a
result. Increasing the level of disaggregation should improve the explanatory power further theoretically but at the same
time inducing attenuation bias empirically because the mean would then be estimated with fewer firms. These two
forces work against each other and complicate the interpretations of the regression results, hence we focus on year and
year-industry at the 2-digit level demeaning in this paper as mentioned in the Introduction.
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Table 3.2: Explanatory Power of the Granular Residual
Panel A: GR with Year Demeaning
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
USA Germany UK Canada
Γt 1.83∗∗ 2.51∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗ 0.93∗∗ 0.08 -0.00 -0.22 -0.37
(0.69) (0.69) (0.42) (0.44) (0.32) (0.35) (0.58) (0.60)
Γt−1 2.58∗∗∗ 2.88∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗ 1.15∗∗ 0.31 0.35 0.38 0.55
(0.71) (0.67) (0.43) (0.43) (0.32) (0.34) (0.58) (0.59)
Γt−2 2.13∗∗∗ -0.23 -0.14 0.02
(0.71) (0.44) (0.34) (0.59)
Intercept 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01 0.01 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
N 56 55 21 20 22 21 48 47
R2 0.27 0.38 0.42 0.46 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.03
adj. R2 0.24 0.35 0.35 0.36 -0.05 -0.09 -0.03 -0.04
Panel B: GR with 2-digit Industry Demeaning
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
USA Germany UK Canada
Γt 2.79∗∗∗ 3.70∗∗∗ -0.04 0.00 0.21 0.00 -0.29 -0.57
(0.76) (0.78) (0.61) (0.55) (0.61) (0.68) (0.70) (0.72)
Γt−1 3.34∗∗∗ 3.92∗∗∗ 1.60∗∗ 1.95∗∗∗ 0.71 0.71 0.73 0.78
(0.74) (0.71) (0.60) (0.58) (0.59) (0.64) (0.70) (0.70)
Γt−2 2.07∗∗∗ 0.48 -0.24 0.32
(0.75) (0.55) (0.61) (0.70)
Intercept 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
N 56 55 21 20 22 21 48 47
R2 0.37 0.48 0.31 0.44 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.05
adj. R2 0.35 0.45 0.24 0.34 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02
* for p < .1, ** for p < .05, and *** for p < .01. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Depvar: Per capita GDP growth is regressed on the granular residuals calculated over the top 100 firms.
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3.4 Deconstructing the Empirical Results
We first examine the relative importance of top ranking firms amongst themselves in explaining
GDP fluctuations. Since the ranking of these top firms changes every year, we drop observations
that have the same ranking to construct the new GR. The results are presented in Figure 3.2 where
we drop a top ranked “composite firm” one at a time and plot the percentage reduction in adjusted-
R2s against its average weights over the sample period. The figure shows lower ranks bunched
together around zero in all four countries, suggesting their relative importance is small. However,
the impact of the largest firms is prominent in all countries with the starkest contrast in the case of
the US.
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Figure 3.2: Reduction in Adjusted-R2 after Dropping Top Ranked Firms
In light of this finding, we construct the granular residual with just the top 10 ranks to find
that the positive findings in the US and Germany can be explained just as well (see Table 3.3).
Table 3.4 additionally shows dropping top 10 ranks reduces the explanatory power significantly
and the coefficients are no long significant. In the UK and Canada, however, firms of the same
ranks did not play a significant role and dropping them leaves the adjusted R2 as low as before and
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the coefficients remain insignificant.14 Since summing up the granular residuals for the top ranks
dilute their explanatory power in the UK and Canada, we suspect the diversification mechanism
may be at work still in these two countries.
Table 3.3: Explanatory Power of the Granular Residual with the Top 10 Ranks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
USA Germany UK Canada
Γt 2.71∗∗∗ 3.30∗∗∗ -0.01 0.01 0.24 0.17 -0.46 -0.65
(0.74) (0.74) (0.67) (0.62) (0.90) (0.91) (0.69) (0.71)
Γt−1 3.03∗∗∗ 3.34∗∗∗ 1.77∗∗ 2.03∗∗∗ 0.99 1.14 0.40 0.39
(0.72) (0.70) (0.66) (0.64) (0.88) (0.92) (0.69) (0.70)
Γt−2 1.77∗∗ 0.30 -0.92 0.44
(0.73) (0.62) (0.88) (0.70)
Intercept 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
N 56 55 21 20 22 21 48 47
R2 0.36 0.44 0.30 0.40 0.06 0.14 0.02 0.04
adj. R2 0.34 0.41 0.22 0.29 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03
* p < .1, ** p < .05, and *** p < .01. Per capita GDP growth is regressed on the granular
residuals calculated over the top 10 ranks.
To further examine where the differences in the contribution of top firms with comparable
importance could be coming from, we construct the rank specific weighted idiosyncratic shock
and plot its correlation with GDP growth in Figure 3.3.15 The right column of the figure shows
unambiguously that the top ranks in Germany and the US are also positively correlated with GDP
growth, but the picture is much more nuanced for Canada and the UK. We conclude that the higher
tendency of high ranking firms moving in opposite directions in the UK and Canada neutralizes the
effect of idiosyncratic shocks, thus it is not surprising the final measure of granular residual–the
sum–do not explain aggregate fluctuations for these two countries.
The last piece of the puzzle remains as to why shocks diversify away in the case of the UK
and Canada but not in the US or Germany. The reason may be that top ranked firms in these two
14This conclusion is robust to dropping the top 15 ranks.
15We compute the correlation between GDP growth and the contemporaneous rank-specific GR, with its one lag and
then two lags. In the end we plot the average of the three correlations against the rank’s average sales to GDP ratio.
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Table 3.4: Explanatory Power of the Granular Residual without the Top 10 Ranks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
USA Germany UK Canada
Γt -1.92 -1.90 -4.34 -3.76 0.23 -0.11 0.50 0.25
(2.50) (2.53) (3.10) (3.09) (1.13) (1.58) (1.33) (1.34)
Γt−1 -0.12 -0.33 2.39 3.58 0.81 0.94 0.97 1.37
(2.49) (2.56) (3.12) (3.54) (1.13) (1.52) (1.32) (1.34)
Γt−2 -2.07 1.03 0.43 -0.85
(2.54) (3.09) (1.26) (1.33)
Intercept 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01 0.01 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
N 56 55 21 20 22 21 48 47
R2 0.01 0.02 0.21 0.25 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03
adj. R2 -0.03 -0.03 0.13 0.11 -0.07 -0.13 -0.03 -0.04
* for p < .1, ** for p < .05, and *** for p < .01. Per capita GDP growth is regressed on the
granular residuals calculated over the top 11-100 firms.
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Figure 3.3: Correlation between Firm Specific GR and GDP Growth
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Table 3.5: Top 10 Sectors in 2002
Canada Germany
Rank SIC2 # Top Firms SY SIC2 # Top Firms
S
Y
1 Elec. 5 6.47 Trans.Eq. 8 16.12
2 Food Strs. 5 5.34 Conglmrts. 3 7.52
3 Comm. 8 4.19 Chem. 14 6.82
4 Trans.Eq. 4 3.64 Comm. 5 3.59
5 Metal Ind. 7 2.57 G.Mechdis.Strs 2 2.59
6 G.Mechdis.Strs. 2 1.28 Metal Ind. 5 2.23
7 Chem. 5 1.16 Trans.Svcs 2 1.83
8 Paper and Allied 5 0.98 Machne.Eq. 14 1.60
9 Lumber 7 0.89 Motr.Warehsing. 1 1.59
10 Railroad Trans. 2 0.84 Whsl Tr. 4 1.30
UK US
Rank SIC2 # Top Firms SY SIC2 # Top Firms
S
Y
1 Food Prd. 8 6.41 Trans.Eq. 8 5.09
2 Chem. 7 6.33 G.Mechdis.Strs 8 4.27
3 Comm. 7 5.88 Comm. 11 3.48
4 Food Strs. 5 3.76 Chem. 10 2.64
5 G.Mechdis.Strs 4 3.53 Food Strs. 6 1.71
6 MetalMining 2 3.10 Conglmrts. 2 1.63
7 Trans.Eq. 4 2.18 Food Prd. 7 1.60
8 Biz.Svcs. 6 1.74 Machne.Eq. 6 1.52
9 Whsl Tr. 3 1.51 Biz.Svcs. 4 1.52
10 Prntn.Pub. 4 1.44 Whsl Tr. 4 1.34
Top 10 sectors as ranked by sector sales of top 100 firms (in the overall economy) in 2001.
countries are spread out across more sectors or they are from sectors not as interconnected with the
rest of the economy. With our data and methodology we are only able to investigate first possibility
here. To do this, we show in Table 3.5 the distributions of top firms by sectors in 2002 and find
that they are similar across countries. Thus the positive results in the US and Germany are not
purely driven by the fact that top ranking firms are from sectors that are also of disproportionate
importance in the economy.
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3.5 Conclusion
This paper quantifies the importance of firm level idiosyncratic shocks in explaining aggregate
fluctuations. It is motivated by the theoretical framework (Gabaix, 2011) that shows in an economy
with fat-tailed size distribution of firms, law of large numbers breaks down and idiosyncratic shocks
to firms diversify at a much milder rate and lead to nontrivial effects on aggregate fluctuations. In
the data, firm level shocks are estimated as the demeaned productivity growth rates, where the
mean is calculated over top firms of the year or of the year and industry. These shocks are then
weighted by firms’ sales to GDP ratio, and the empirical strategy tests whether the sum of these
weighted shocks statistically explains GDP fluctuations.
We find shocks to large firms are of little relevance in the UK or Canada but explain roughly 1/3
of the output fluctuations in the US and Germany. While top ranking firms contribute the most to
granular effects, they do not always sum up to play a significant role in every country. We conclude
that the reason they did not explain GDP growth in the UK and Canada is because diversification is
at work still in these two countries. Our results suggest while firm size distribution is found to be
highly skewed in most economies, the ability of the largest firms to transmit shocks is not universal.
Future studies on the micro-foundation of aggregate fluctuations should take into account that apart
from the granular theory, other transmission mechanisms may be at work, and the importance of
which may differ on a country-by-country basis.
93
3.6 Appendix: Additional Figures
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Figure 3.4: Number of Firms with Valid Sales and Employee Data
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